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NOTES
THE FIRST AMENDMENT DISTINCTION BETWEEN
CONDUCT AND CONTENT: A CONCEPTUAL
FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING FIGHTING
WORDS JURISPRUDENCE
AVIVA 0. WERTHEIMER*
"A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of
a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according
to the circumstances and the time in which it is used."'
INTRODUCrION
No fundamental right is more glorified in American society than the
right to "freedom of speech." We Americans believe that the right to
express our ideas freely, and more importantly, the right to criticize
our government, is tantamount to the preservation of all of our other
cherished rights.2 As for the level of protection afforded the right of
speech, the First Amendment could not have been more clear or con-
cise on this point: "Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom
of speech."3
Yet, despite this perception that our First Amendment rights are
absolute,4 there are certain instances when speech rights may be cur-
tailed, for better or worse, in the name of some more compelling pur-
pose.5 Moreover, there is a considerable body of law that prohibits or
punishes libel, slander, perjury, conspiracy, treason and the like, even
though these unlawful acts may be accomplished solely by speech.
* I wish to extend my deepest gratitude to Professor Thane Rosenbaum of Ford-
ham University School of Law for his invaluable guidance, encouragement, and edito-
rial support during the preparation of this Note and throughout my law school
studies.
1. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.) (citation omitted).
2. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937) (stating that freedom of
speech is "the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom"); see
also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958) (Black, J., concurring) (stating that
the freedoms secured by the F'rst Amendment "are absolutely indispensable for the
preservation of a free society").
3. U.S. Const. amend. I.
4. See Alex Kozinski & Eugene Volokh, A Penumbra Too Far, 106 Harv. L Rev.
1639, 1654 (1993) (characterizing the First Amendment as "about as close to absolute
as the Constitution gets").
5. Even Supreme Court Justices Douglas and Black, who insisted they were First
Amendment "absolutists" in the broadest sense, would deny constitutional protec-
tion to some speech by simply renaming the speech as: "speech brigaded with ac-
tion"; "speech plus"; or "not speech." John H. Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A
Theory of Judicial Review 109 (1980).
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Thus, the notion of "freedom of speech" is clearly "narrower than the
unlimited license to talk."6
Some fifty years ago, the Supreme Court established the doctrine of
"fighting words," which limited the "license to talk" when the chosen
words took on the force of violent aggression that was likely to result
in retaliatory conduct. The basic principle of the doctrine was that,
under certain circumstances, communications-apart from the con-
tent of their message-take on a hostile, fighting quality that makes
the communications more likely to engender violent consequences. In
defining a category termed "fighting words," the Court wrote that
"[t]here are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any. constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting'
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace."'7
In establishing the fighting words doctrine, the Court determined
that when a speaker's words do not contribute to dialogue or the ex-
pression of ideas, but are instead intended to provoke harmful con-
duct, they have no value as instruments of "speech." Therefore, they
may be regulated without contravening the First Amendment. While
"speech" is protected under the Constitution, words that do not pro-
mote dialogue or the exchange of ideas are instruments of something
other than speech. Depending on the context and circumstances be-
hind the communications, a speaker's words may have nothing at all
to do with the exercise of the constitutional right to freedom of
speech.8
Ultimately, however, the Court designated fighting words as a cate-
gory of speech wholly unprotected by the First Amendment-even
though the fighting words doctrine is only incidentally related to
6. Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50 (1961).
7. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) (citations omitted).
8. This may explain why the Court placed the emphasis on fighting "words,"
rather than fighting "speech." Words are merely the raw ingredients that have the
potential, based on the context of the communication, to evolve into either protected
speech or certain forms of unprotected conduct.
In his comic routine, "Filthy Words," social satirist George Carlin aptly observed
that there are seven dirty words that "you couldn't say on the public ... airwaves."
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 751-55 (1978). Carlin then proceeded to use a
list of expletives in his monologue "to satirize as harmless and essentially silly our
attitudes towards those words." Id. at 730.
Ultimately, as a regulatory matter, the Supreme Court upheld an FCC sanction
against the Pacifica Foundation, the company that owned the radio station that broad-
casted Carlin's monologue. Id. at 750. The Court noted that "[i]ndeed, we may as-
sume, arguendo, that this monologue would be protected in other contexts." Id. at
746-47 (observing that it is "a characteristic of speech such as this that both its capac-
ity to offend and its 'social value' ... vary with the circumstances"). But it could not
say that the FCC had exceeded its statutory power by imposing the sanction for inde-
cent language based on a nuisance rationale. Id. at 750.
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speech.9 The Court understood fighting words to be a form of con-
duct, or "verbal acts,"'" analogous to conduct that is likely to have
violent consequences. From its inception, the premise underlying the
doctrine was not the restriction of certain words, but the prevention of
instances when those words are used to provoke breaches of the
peace."
Since 1942, courts routinely have applied the fighting words doc-
trine to interpret local and state laws that restricted speech in the ser-
vice of preventing violence. Yet, in the half century following the
Supreme Court's articulation of the doctrine, no convictions in cases
in which a defendant was prosecuted under a fighting words statute
have been upheld. Instead, in a long line of cases dealing with fighting
words, the Court has used a myriad of rationales to uphold some stat-
utes as permissible restrictions on conduct and to strike down other,
similar laws as unconstitutional infringements on speech rights.12
These decisions have produced a seemingly arbitrary distinction be-
tween speech and conduct in this area of First Amendment law and
reflect what critics argue is the futility of the fighting words doctrine.1 3
Indeed, critics have argued that the Court has steadily chipped away
at the scope of the doctrine, and that the doctrine's failing record is
reason enough to have it formally overturned.' Until 1992, however,
no Supreme Court decision had explicitly considered that option.
The Supreme Court's 1992 decision in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
questioned the very notion that the First Amendment does not protect
the otherwise proscribable category of fighting words. 6 In R.A.V.,
the Court overturned a conviction for cross burning by striking down
the fighting words ordinance under which the defendant had been
prosecuted. 7 The Court concluded that, although in the past, the cat-
egory of fighting words was apparently proscribable in its entirety, the
9. The category of speech called fighting words, like other categories of unpro-
tected speech, is routinely referred to by the Court, and in this Note, as a "proscrib-
able category of speech." See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2552 (1992)
(White, J., concurring) (describing categories of proscribable speech).
The Court's use of the categorical approach refers to its designation of discrete
categories of speech, such as libel, obscenity and fighting words, which the Court has
defined as "not within the area of constitutionally protected speech." Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text. But see
infra note 301 (questioning the viability of the categorical approach after KA. V.v.
City of St. Paul).
10. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574.
11. Id. at 573 (characterizing a fighting words statute as "narrowly drawn and lim-
ited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the domain of state power, the
use in a public place of words likely to cause a breach of the peace").
12. See infra part I.A.
13. See sources cited inifra note 305.
14. See sources cited infra note 305.
15. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
16. Id. at 2543.
17. Id. at 2547.
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subset of fighting words punishable by the St. Paul ordinance1 8 may be
entitled to some First Amendment protection.19 It did not, however,
seize the opportunity in R.A.V. to overturn the fighting words doc-
trine altogether.
This confusing decision, in which the Court declined to reaffirm that
fighting words fall outside the scope of First Amendment protection
as a category of proscribable speech, left state legislators in a quan-
dary. In an era of increasing racial and other bias-motivated vio-
lence,2" legislatures nationwide had to reconsider whether in-
tentionally threatening forms of expression, communicated by one
person to another, are constitutionally proscribable as fighting words,
or protected by the First Amendment. The discussion spread
to academics at universities, concerning politically correct speech
and hate speech codes,2' to race theorists2 and to cities across
18. The St. Paul ordinance prohibited only those fighting words based on "race,
color, creed, religion or gender." Id. at 2541 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code
§ 292.02 (1990)).
19. The Court explained that St. Paul could not punish fighting words based on
the content of their message. Id. at 2543-45. For a discussion of the Court's opinion in
R.A.V., see infra part II.A.1.
20. See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Hate Crime Statutes: A 1991
Status Report 11 (1991); Erik FitzPatrick, Note, An Analysis of the Constitutionality of
the Vermont Hate Motivated Crimes Statute in Light of the United States Supreme
Court's Decisions in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul and Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 18 Vt. L.
Rev. 771, 783-87 (1994) (documenting the increase in hate crimes nationally since
1980).
21. See UWM Post, Inc. v. Board of Regents, 774 F. Supp. 1163, 1172 (E.D. Wis.
1991) (setting aside hate speech rules at the University of Wisconsin because the rules
restricted speech in excess of fighting words); Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F.
Supp. 852, 863 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (setting aside the University of Michigan hate
speech policy because it prohibited words "simply because [they were] found to be
offensive"); see also Katharine T. Bartlett & Jean O'Barr, The Chilly Climate on Col-
lege Campuses: An Expansion of the "Hate Speech" Debate, 1990 Duke L.J. 574, 582-
84 (arguing that the "hate speech" debate should be expanded to include racism, sex-
ism and heterosexism on college campuses); Charles R. Lawrence III, If He Hollers
Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 Duke L.J. 431, 456 (justify-
ing campus speech regulations as "necessary to protect a captive audience from offen-
sive or injurious speech"); Robert A. Sedler, The Unconstitutionality of Campus Bans
on "Racist Speech:" The View from Without and Within, 53 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 631, 633
(1992) (arguing that virtually any ban on speech at public universities would be un-
constitutional under the First Amendment); Nadine Strossen, Regulating Racist
Speech on Campus, A Modest Proposal?, 1990 Duke LJ. 484, 523-41 (criticizing the
regulation of racist speech as a mechanism to combat discrimination on college cam-
puses); James Weinstein, A Constitutional Roadmap to the Regulation of Campus Hate
Speech, 38 Wayne L. Rev. 163, 191-214 (1992) (arguing that university administrators
may regulate hate speech on the basis of its content, in non-public forums such as
classrooms).
22. Critical race theory, a popular trend in contemporary legal thinking, is devoted
to finding new ways to think about and act in pursuit of racial justice. Race theorists
who would regulate hate speech on the basis of its racist content argue that content-
based distinctions are acceptable if they further the desirable ends of eradicating ra-
cism from American culture and enhancing the freedom of all citizens. The principal
architects of critical race theory are Professors Mari J. Matsuda, Charles R. Lawrence
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America, concerning hate crime and penalty enhancement legisla-
tion.23
In the year following R.A.V., the Supreme Court, in Wisconsin v.
Mitchell,24 upheld as constitutional a penalty enhancement statute that
increased the punishment for a variety of crimes where the defendant
targeted a victim because of one or more immutable characteristics,
including race, religion or ethnic background.2a The Court treated the
statute in Mitchell as a restriction only on conduct-the selection of a
victim based on his or her race, religion or ethnic background-and
not on speech. While not inconsistent with its analysis in R.A.V., this
approach demonstrates the apparent incoherence of the Court's dis-
tinction between speech and conduct2 6
Im and Richard Delgado. Each has published a proposal for the regulation of racist
speech based on the principles of fighting words. See Richard Delgado, Words That
Wound." A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets and Name-Calling, 17 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 133, 179-81 (1982) (proposing an independent tort action for racial in-
sults); Lawrence, supra note 21, at 451-53 (advocating regulation of racist speech as
fighting words); Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the
Victim's Story, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2320,2380-81 (1989) (asserting that an absolutist First
Amendment response to hate speech perpetuates racism, and advocating regulation
of racist speech). All three articles, and an additional article by Professor Kimberle
W. Crenshaw, entitled Beyond Racism and Misogyny: Black Feminism and 2 Live
Crew, were recently published in one volume. See Mari J. Matsuda et al., Words that
Wound: Critical Race Theory, Assaultive Speech, and the First Amendment (1993).
23. Compare State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558,565 (Or. 1992) (en banc) (upholding
a penalty enhancement statute as a proscription on conduct not speech), cert. denied,
113 S. Ct. 2967 (1993) with State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 815 (Wis. 1992) (striking
a penalty enhancement statute on the grounds that the state may not punish bigoted
thought), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) and State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 459 (Ohio
1992) (striking an "ethnic intimidation" penalty enhancement statute because it im-
permissibly punished thought), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993), rev'd,
624 N.E.2d 722, 724 (1994).
While bias crime statutes make bias intent a necessary element of the crime, pen-
alty enhancement statutes increase the punishment for the underlying crime because
the victim was selected intentionally due to some bias on the part of the defendant.
Nearly every state has passed some sort of "hate crime statute," whether in the form
of the former or the latter. See Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Hate Crime
Statutes: A 1991 Status Report (1991).
This Note focuses on statutes that reach speech activity that would not be criminal
but for the improper intent of the speaker and the likely results of the speech. For
examples of such hate crime statutes, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-9-121 (1986 & Supp.
1994); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 53a-181b (West 1985 & Supp. 1994); Idaho Code § 18-
7902 (1987); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann. § 750.147b (West 1991); Mont. Code Ann. § 45-
5-221 (1993); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 21, § 850 (West Supp. 1995); S.D. Codified Laws
Ann. § 22-19b-1 (1994); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 9A.36.080 (West 1988 & Supp.
1994). This Note also examines statutes that enhance penalties for underlying crimes
that may be committed solely by a defendant's speech. For examples of such penalty
enhancement statutes, see NJ. Stat. Ann. § 2C:33-4 (West 1982 & Supp. 1994); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 1455-56 (Supp. 1994).
24. 113 S. CL 2194 (1993).
25. Id. at 2197.
26. Both the St. Paul and Wisconsin laws attempted to prohibit bias motivated
hate crimes. The St. Paul ordinance prohibited fighting words on the basis of one of a
list of immutable characteristics. See supra note 18. The Wisconsin statute enhanced
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This Note attempts to provide a framework for understanding the
principles underlying the fighting words doctrine. It rejects the notion
that the First Amendment, by its terms, precludes all restrictions on
speech. Nevertheless, it argues that First Amendment rights are of
only minimal significance when it comes to applying the fighting
words doctrine. 7 Rather, in creating the fighting words doctrine, the
Court sought to restrict only the conduct implications of words, and
not the value of words when used to advance ideas in the context of
dialogue. Fighting words are, therefore, proscribable on the basis of
the conduct they engender, rather than on the basis of the content of
the words themselves.
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of the government re-
strictions placed on speech prior to the creation of the fighting words
doctrine. It then reviews the key fighting words cases, beginning with
the doctrine's inception in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire. These cases
show no clear doctrinal development in understanding how fighting
words operate as a proscribable category of speech. Nor do they sug-
gest a predictable pattern of reasoned judgment in this area of First
Amendment jurisprudence.
Part II focuses on the Supreme Court's opinion in R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, in which the nine Justices reached consensus only in the final
result. Specifically, part II critiques the majority's opinion for its un-
warranted departure from established First Amendment principles, as
well as its apparent failure to construct an adequate, workable struc-
ture for lower courts to follow. Part II also reviews the Court's deci-
sion in Wisconsin v. Mitchell and highlights the incompatibility of the
Court's reasoning between R.A.V. and Mitchell.
Part III examines the concepts of "speech" and "conduct." This
part suggests that the Court's formal distinction between speech and
conduct, as pronounced in United States v. O'Brien, provides a helpful
backdrop for understanding the principles underlying the fighting
words doctrine and lends coherence to an otherwise irreconcilable
body of caselaw. Part III explains that the fighting words doctrine,
though conceived as a proscribable category of speech, was estab-
lished to prevent potentially violent conduct. Therefore, the Court's
decisions in the cases reviewed in part I, and its analysis in R.A. V. and
the penalty when a defendant selected a victim on the basis of a similar list of charac-
teristics. See supra text accompanying note 25. Yet, the Court treated the former as
an impermissible content-based restriction on speech, and the latter as a justifiable
content-based restriction on conduct.
27. Some scholars have suggested that the First Amendment right to free speech
should be balanced against other equally valuable fundamental rights, and if neces-
sary, should be compromised to protect those other rights. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar,
The Case of the Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 Harv. L. Rev.
124, 155-60 (1992) (asserting that the Thirteenth Amendment's guarantee of freedom
from slavery, when balanced against competing First Amendment rights, provides a
basis for regulating racist hate speech).
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Mitchell as discussed in part II, can be reconciled as further develop-
ments in understanding the conduct implications of fighting words.
Part IV suggests that legislatures should consider the conduct impli-
cations of fighting words in constructing statutes to prevent the harm
and violence associated with hate crimes, even when those crimes are
comprised solely of speech. Thus, the fighting words doctrine can be
understood and implemented in a manner that reflects the purpose of
the original doctrine and is, at the same time, consistent with the
Court's current jurisprudence.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Although Americans proudly assert their right to free speech as one
of the centerpieces of democracy, "it is well understood that the right
of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circum-
stances."' Rather, "the character of every act depends upon the cir-
cumstances in which it is done."2 9 In fact, just seven years after the
framers of the Bill of Rights amended the Constitution to state:
"Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech," 30
Congress imposed a restriction on speech. Against the political back-
drop of a potential war with France, the Federalists enacted the Sedi-
tion Act of 1798 to prohibit defamatory speech against the
government.31 Ironically, the Act targeted political speech, speech
now commonly considered to rest at the core of First Amendment
protection. Similarly, at the outset of World War I, Congress enacted
the Espionage Act of 1917,32 which again restricted speech critical of
the government. The Supreme Court repeatedly rejected Frst
Amendment challenges to the Espionage Act, holding that Congress
28. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942).
29. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
30. U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added).
31. Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, § 2, 1 Stat. 596 (1789). The Act prohibited, in
relevant part, the publication of "any false, scandalous and malicious writing ...
against the government of the United States ... with intent to defame... or to excite
against them.., the hatred of the good people of the United States." Id.
The Act, targeting political speech, was rigorously enforced against rival Republi-
can Party members; every defendant tried under the Act was convicted. The Supreme
Court never considered its constitutionality, though lower federal courts upheld the
Act unanimously. The Act expired on March 3, 1801.
32. Act of June 15, 1917, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217 (1917). The Act made it a crimi-
nal offense, when the country was at war, to "cause or attempt to cause insubordina-
tion, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces... [or to]
obstruct the recruiting or enlistment service of the United States." Id The Act was
amended in 1918 to make it a crime for a person to "utter, print, write, or publish any
disloyal, profane, scurrilous, or abusive language about [the] form of government of
the United States, or the Constitution of the United States... or the flag." Act of
May 16, 1918, ch. 75, § 3, 40 Stat. 553 (1918). Approximately 2000 defendants were
prosecuted under the Espionage Acts of 1917 and 1918.
For a history of free speech prior to the Espionage Act, see David M. Rabban, The
First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 Yale tJ. 514 (1981).
1994]
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had the right to restrict words "used in such circumstances and.., of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger. '33 Although it
is arguable whether the Sedition and Espionage Acts would survive
First Amendment scrutiny today, it is clear that the Supreme Court
interpreted the First Amendment to permit restrictions on speech, in-
cluding political speech, when there was a possibility that the speech
could result in violence.
Similarly, it was not until fairly recently that the right of "freedom
of speech" was even interpreted to protect citizens against state regu-
lations abridging speech.34 Prior to 1925, the Supreme Court had not
questioned that the First Amendment meant: "Congress shall make
no law abridging the freedom of speech. ' 35 States were free to regu-
late the "speech" of their respective citizens subject to the restraints
imposed by their own constitutions. Once the Court did recognize the
application of the First Amendment to the states, however, it contin-
ued to construe this protection narrowly, allowing state regulations to
continue largely inviolate of the Constitution.3 6
In 1942, for example, during the Second World War, the Supreme
Court upheld a state regulation on speech. In Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire,37 the defendant challenged the constitutionality of the dis-
33. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919); see also Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (upholding a conviction under the Espionage Act); Debs
v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (same); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919) (same).
Justice Holmes, who wrote for a unanimous Court in Schenck, Frohwerk and Debs,
was also the sole dissenter in Abrams. In Schenck, Holmes first articulated the "clear
and present danger" test to determine when speech could be constitutionally re-
stricted. His dissent in Abrams marked the initial shift from a restrictive construction
of the "clear and present danger" test to a more libertarian position in which the test
was used more often to protect speech than to restrict it. See Geoffrey R. Stone et al.,
Constitutional Law 1038 (2d ed. 1991). By the early 1940's, Justice Holmes' dissent in
Abrams had become the law. See Michael J. Mannheimer, Note, The Fighting Words
Doctrine, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 1527, 1537 (1993). The "clear and present danger" test
still remains an exception to the First Amendment guarantee of free speech. See
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that speech advocating un-
lawful activity is protected unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action").
34. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("Freedom of speech ...
protected by the First Amendment from abridgement by Congress [is] among the
fundamental personal rights and 'liberties' protected by the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."); see also Whitney v. Cali-
fornia, 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927) (including First Amendment guarantee of free speech
in the term "liberty" as used in the Fourteenth Amendment); Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U.S. 380, 387 (1927) (same).
35. U.S. Const. amend. I (emphasis added).
36. It was not until after World War I that the Warren Court expanded the use of
the First Amendment as a shield to protect free speech. See Henry Louis Gates, Jr.,
Let Them Talk. Why Civil Liberties Pose No Threat to Civil Rights, The New Repub-
lic, Sept. 20 & 27, 1993, at 37, 39.
37. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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orderly conduct statute under which he had been convicted. The
defendant, a Jehovah's Witness, was prosecuted for calling the Roch-
ester City Marshal "a God damned racketeer" and "a damned fascist"
and asserting that "the whole government of Rochester are Fascists or
agents of Fascists. ' 39 The Supreme Court, applying the New Hamp-
shire Supreme Court's limiting construction of the statute,40 unani-
mously affirmed the conviction.4
The Chaplinsky Court established a category of speech that it
deemed unprotected by the First Amendment and thus proscribable
without fear of compromising fundamental "speech" rights. It coined
the term "fighting words"'4 to describe the category of those words,
which, "by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an imme-
diate breach of the peace."'43 The Court proclaimed that such words
are of "no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit... is ... out-
weighed by the social interest in order.""4
This definition must have seemed clear and concise to Justice Mur-
phy and the Justices who joined him in the unanimous decision. But
in the years following Chaplinsky, courts have continuously examined
and applied the doctrine of fighting words, apparently, without much
clarity or success.
38. The New Hampshire law at issue stated:
"No person shall address any offensive, derisive or annoying word to any
other person who is lawfully in any street or other public place, nor call him
by any offensive or derisive name, nor make any noise or exclamation in his
presence and hearing with intent to deride, offend or annoy him, or to pre-
vent him from pursuing his lawful business or occupation."
Id. at 569 (quoting the Public Laws of New Hampshire, Ch. 378, § 2).
39. Id. at 569. The episode took place when the City Marshal warned Chaplinsky
that his public denunciation of religion and the distribution of literature about his
religious sect, though lawful, were drawing a restless and potentially riotous crowd.
Id at 569-70.
40. In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, the Supreme Court lacks juris-
diction to construe state legislation authoritatively. See United States v. Thirty-seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (citation omitted). Instead, the Court is bound
by a state court's limiting construction of that law. See Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 355 (1983); Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494
n.5 (1982) (citation omitted).
In Chaplinsky, the state court declared that the purpose of the statute was to pre-
serve the public peace; thus, no words were "'forbidden except such as have a direct
tendency to cause acts of violence by the persons to whom, individually, the remark is
addressed.' . . .The test is what men of common intelligence would understand would
be words likely to cause an average addressee to fight." 315 U.S. at 573 (quoting
earlier New Hampshire cases, State v. Brown, 38 A. 731 (N.H. 1895) and State v.
McConnell, 47 A. 267 (N.H. 1900), in which the New Hampshire Supreme Court had
authoritatively interpreted and limited the scope of the statute to instances where the
speech tends to cause violence). But see infra text accompanying notes 45-47.
41. 315 U.S. at 574.
42. Id. at 572.
43. Id.
44. Id
1994]
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A. When are Words "Fighting Words"?
Although the purpose of the New Hampshire legislature may have
been to purge social discourse of its less palatable elements, the
Court's reasoning in Chaplinsky, as well as in subsequent cases, dem-
onstrates a different conception of fighting words. The characteriza-
tion of fighting words as words with only "slight social value" that are
"no essential part of any exposition of ideas"45 may suggest that the
Chaplinsky Court meant to exclude entirely certain words from the
scope of First Amendment protection. But no court has ever applied
the doctrine so narrowly. Even with regard to Chaplinsky's state-
ments, no one would claim that the Court intended categorically to
except the words "damn" and "fascist" from protected speech. 6 The
Court's definition of fighting words must be understood as an attempt
to balance the speaker's right to speak with the state's competing in-
terest to keep the peace.47 It is not that statements such as Chaplin-
sky's are not, or may never be, expressions of legitimate ideas.4 8
Rather, the Court's goal was to prevent breaches of the peace.49
The Justices may not have been solely concerned with just the one
breach of the peace brought about by Chaplinsky's particular state-
ments. There was, perhaps, more concern that public speech opposing
the government in the midst of a world war could lead to other
breaches of the peace.50 With Chaplinsky, the Court may have been
45. Id.
46. The Court included in its definition of fighting words both what it termed
"classical fighting words," as well as "words in current use ... equally likely to cause
violence, and other disorderly words." Id. at 573. This flexible definition indicates
that the Court understood the fluctuating nature of language in society and intended
that the category of fighting words should remain fluid. See also National Assoc. of
Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 284 (1974) (stating that the word "fascist" in
and of itself is protected speech that may be used to express an opinion of someone or
some group); Cafeteria Employees Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 295 (1943)
(describing the word "fascist" as "part of the conventional give-and-take in our eco-
nomic and political controversies").
47. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573-74.
48. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974) ("Under the First
Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious an opinion
may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but
on the competition of other ideas.").
49. Despite its flowery language regarding the low value of certain speech, the
Court understood that the statute was meant to prevent disorderly conduct, and not
to restrict "speech." In concluding that the statute did not contravene the constitu-
tional right to free expression, the Court wrote that "[i]t is a statute narrowly drawn
and limited to define and punish specific conduct.., the use in a public place of words
likely to cause a breach of the peace." Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 573 (emphasis added).
50. Accusing a local politician of fascist tendencies in 1942 certainly could have
resulted in a violent response by the politician to whom the remarks were directed.
But see Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 135 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring)
(stating that a police officer may be expected to exercise a greater degree of restraint
than the average citizen). The same might be said about a politician who is exposed
to public criticism regularly and should learn restraint in responding to criticism or
even personal insults.
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signalling how much the conduct implications of words depend on the
context of the situation in which the words are spoken. As this Note
proceeds to examine the historical line of fighting words-related cases
that followed Chaplinsky, it is important to consider the vital role
played by the conduct implications of words in the different circum-
stances in which they are spoken, and the Court's somewhat erratic
and seemingly unprincipled application of the fighting words doctrine.
In Terminiello v. Chicago,5 a post-war 1949 case, the Court re-
versed the defendant's conviction for disorderly conduct.5 2 The
charge against the defendant arose from his address to a group of
some eight hundred people in which he criticized various political and
racial groups for activities he denounced as "inimical to the nation's
welfare."53 The city ordinance under which the defendant was
charged prohibited persons from "'making any improper noise, riot,
disturbance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of
the peace.' ,54 The Court never reached the issue of whether the de-
fendant's speech constituted fighting words.5 Instead, it reversed the
conviction on the ground that the statute, as construed by the trial
judge, was overbroad.56
The trial judge had instructed the jury that they could convict the
defendant for a breach of the peace if his "misbehavior ... stirs the
public to anger, invites dispute, [or] brings about a condition of un-
rest. '57 The Supreme Court reasoned that the statute, as interpreted
by the trial judge, prohibited more expression than was necessary to
secure the peace.58 The Court noted with irony that "indeed [speech
may] best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of un-
rest."59 Thus, the trial judge's construction, which was binding on the
Supreme Court, rendered the statute unconstitutionally overbroad.60
51. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
52. Id. at 6.
53. Id. at 2-3. Though a group of police officers had been assigned to control the
mass of protestors outside the auditorium where the defendant was speaking, they
could not maintain order. Several disturbances broke out. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 2 n.1 (quoting Municipal Code of Chicago § 193-1 (1939)).
55. See id. at 3.
56. Id. at 6. As applied to First Amendment issues, the doctrine of overbreadth
requires that the Court strike down a law that sweeps within its ambit not only pros-
cribable speech, but speech that is otherwise protected under the First Amendment.
See Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
57. 337 U.S. at 3.
58. Although the government argued that the Illinois appellate courts had as-
sumed that only "conduct constituting 'fighting words'" was punishable under the
statute, the Court rejected that contention. It concluded instead that, as construed on
the record in the judge's jury charge, at least part of the ordinance was unconstitution-
ally overbroad. Id. at 5-6. Because the record was unclear as to which provision the
defendant's charge rested on, the defendant's conviction had to be overturned. Id. at
6.
59. Id. at 4.
60. Id. Justice Vinson, in his dissent, pointed out that, like the Illinois appellate
courts, defendant's counsel also understood the ordinance as prohibiting only the use
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Just two years later, in a similar case, Feiner v. New York, the Court
directly addressed whether a defendant's political speech before a ra-
cially mixed audience was punishable under a disorderly conduct stat-
ute.6' In the course of a speech about racial discrimination and civil
liberties delivered on a street comer to publicize a meeting of the
Young Progressives of America,62 the defendant, Feiner, made derog-
atory remarks about President Truman, local politicians and the
American Legion. 63 Upon refusing to accede to a police officer's re-
quest to discontinue his remarks, Feiner was arrested.64 The defend-
ant challenged his conviction under the disorderly conduct statute on
the ground that the statute violated the First Amendment. 65 Despite
its recent holding in Terminiello, the Court upheld the conviction.66 It
reasoned that, on the basis of the facts presented, the defendant was
not convicted because of "the making or the content of his speech...
[but because of] the reaction which it actually engendered." 67
of fighting words. Id. at 7 (Vinson, J., dissenting). Defendant's counsel did not ob)ect
to the one "offending sentence" in the trial judge's jury charge, nor did he include it in
the petition for certiorari. Id. The objection to the trial judge's overbroad construc-
tion of the statute was thus not even presented to the Court for review and should not
have resulted in a reversal of the defendant's conviction. Id.
61. 340 U.S. 315 (1951). The Feiner Court did not articulate its concerns in terms
of fighting words. Nevertheless, the disorderly conduct statute in that case was quite
similar to the New Hampshire statute in Chaplinsky. Section 722 of the Penal Law of
New York, under which the defendant in Feiner was convicted, provided in pertinent
part:
"Any person who with intent to provoke a breach of the peace, or whereby a
breach of the peace may be occasioned, commits any of the following acts
shall be deemed to have committed the offense of disorderly conduct: 1.
Uses offensive... abusive or insulting language, conduct or behavior; 2. Acts
in such a manner as to annoy, disturb... or be offensive to others; 3. Congre-
gates with others on a public street and refuses to move on when ordered by
the police."
Id. at 318 n.1 (emphasis added) (quoting N.Y. Penal Law § 722). Both the New York
and New Hampshire statutes used the same terminology, including the words "offen-
sive" and "offend or annoy," to describe the prohibited activity. See supra note 38.
Though the New Hampshire statute did not include the requirement of an intent to
provoke a breach of the peace, the New Hampshire Supreme Court construed the
statute as a law to prevent breaches of the peace. See supra note 40. As a disorderly
conduct statute, the New York statute is also similar to the Chicago ordinance in
Terminiello v. Chicago. See supra text accompanying note 54.
62. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 329-30 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 316-17. Excerpts from Feiner's remarks as revealed by the record in-
cluded: "Mayor Costello (of Syracuse) is a champagne-sipping bum; he does not
speak for the negro people" and "President Truman is a bum." Id. at 330 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
64. Id. at 317-18.
65. Id. at 316.
66. Id. at 321.
67. Id. at 319-20. The Court did not specify under which section of the statute the
defendant was charged. For a text of the statute, see supra note 61.
According to the majority, the defendant "gave the impression that he was endeav-
oring to arouse the Negro people against the whites .... The statements before such
a mixed audience 'stirred up a little excitement.' "Id. at 317. In his dissent, however,
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In the same year Feiner was decided, the Court heard another First
Amendment case, Beauharnais v. Illinois," in which it upheld a de-
fendant's conviction for distributing white supremacist propagandistic
leaflets on the streets of Chicago. 69 The state court had construed the
challenged statute70 as a criminal libel law.71 Accepting the Illinois
Justice Black concluded that the defendant was convicted because of the unpopular
views he expressed and not for congregating unlawfully on a street comer. Id. at 321-
22 (Black, J., dissenting). Justice Black noted that even the trial judge admitted that
he understood that the street comer meeting was a lawful one. Id at 322 n.2. More-
over, even accepting the findings below (Justice Black criticized the Court for failing
to review the evidence to determine if there had been a denial of a federally protected
right), it was still "far-fetched to suggest that the 'facts' show any imminent threat of
riot or uncontrollable disorder." Id. at 325. Only after one man told police to stop
Feiner or he would stop him himself, did the police warn Feiner to end his speech and
eventually have him arrested. In fact, Justices Black and Douglas asserted that if the
police had any role in the incident, it should have been to protect Feiner's constitu-
tional right to speak. Id. at 327 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 331 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
In other similar instances involving political gatherings and demonstrations, the
Court concluded that there was no imminent danger of a breach of the peace. It,
therefore, reversed those convictions because they were improperly based on the de-
fendants' political messages. See, ag., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 545-46 (1965)
(reviewing the facts of the case, including a film of events, and reversing a disorderly
conduct conviction of a leader of two thousand students who were demonstrating to
protest segregation); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 237 (1963) (reversing
a disorderly conduct conviction for an African-American student demonstration be-
cause the evidence "showed no more than that the opinions which they were peacea-
bly expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority.., to attract a
crowd and necessitate police protection"); cf. Star Opera Co., Inc. v. Hylan, 178
N.Y.S. 179 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (holding that in a rare situation when public authorities
cannot in good faith control a mob audience hostile to the speaker's views, necessity
requires that the speaker be restrained).
68. 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
69. Id. at 267. The leaflet that Beauhamais was charged with unlawfully distribut-
ing was an application for membership in the White Circle League of America, Inc.,
petitioning the Mayor and the City Council of Chicago:
to halt the further encroachment, harassment and invasion of white people,
their property, neighborhoods and persons, by the Negro .... If persuasion
and the need to prevent the white race from becoming mongrelized by the
negro will not unite us, then the aggressions... rapes, robberies, knives,
guns and marijuana of the negro, surely will.
Id at 252.
70. Section 224(a) of the Illinois Criminal Code provided in relevant part:
"It shall be unlawful for any person... [to] advertise or publish, present or
exhibit in any public place in this state any ... publication or exhibition
[which] portrays depravity, criminality, unchastity, or lack of virtue of a class
of citizens, of any race, color, creed or religion which said publication or
exhibition exposes the citizens of any race, color, creed or religion to con-
tempt, derision, or obloquy or which is productive of breach of the peace or
riots."
Id at 251 (quoting Ill. Rev. Stat. 1949).
71. Id. at 253. Though the Illinois statute was not treated as a fighting words stat-
ute, it had similar characteristics to a fighting words statute. Libel, like fighting
words, traditionally has been treated as a proscribable category of speech. See supra
text accompanying note 7. The Court did not require a showing of an imminent
breach of the peace. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 266 ("Libelous utterances not being
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court's construction, the Supreme Court reasoned that if libel was
punishable when directed at individuals, then the same libelous com-
ments when directed at a group surely also could be punishable. 72 De-
spite the fact that libel is unprotected speech whether or not it incites
violence, the Court relied heavily on the historical evidence of racial
violence in Chicago to support its conclusion.73 It reasoned that the
Illinois legislature was justified in prohibiting this sort of leafletting,
though it ordinarily would not be likely to cause breaches of the
peace, because in Illinois, racial intolerance had already resulted in
violent rioting.74
The next important case that impacted the doctrine of fighting
words was United States v. O'Brien." In that 1968 case, the Supreme
Court upheld the defendant's conviction for burning his draft card in
front of a crowd of onlookers.76 The defendant was expressing his
political opposition to American military involvement in Vietnam
and, therefore, argued that the statute at issue and his conviction vio-
lated his First Amendment rights.77 Nevertheless, the Court upheld
within the area of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary.., to consider
[whether the activity resulted in a] 'clear and present danger.' "). Nevertheless, the
state supreme court had described the words prohibited by the statute as those "liable
to cause violence and disorder." Id. at 254. Additionally, the Court's finding that it
was unnecessary even to consider the issue of imminent violence rested on the notion
that the tendency to induce a breach of the peace was the traditional justification for
criminal libel laws, which had always been thought to be immune from the First
Amendment. Id.; see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1205 & n.14 (7th Cir.) (re-jecting the state's alternative reading of Beauharnais as sanctioning the prohibition of
speech without reference to a fear of violence), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
72. Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 258 ("[I]f an utterance directed at an individual may
be the object of criminal sanctions, we cannot deny to a State power to punish the
same utterance directed at a defined group, unless we can say that this is a willful and
purposeless restriction unrelated to the peace and well-being of the State.").
73. Id. at 259-61. Quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940), the
Court stated that "'[t]he danger in these times from the coercive activities of those
who in the delusion of racial or religious conceit would incite violence and breaches of
the peace in order to deprive others of their equal right to the exercise of their liber-
ties, is emphasized by events familiar to all.'" Beauharnais, 343 U.S. at 261 (emphasis
added).
74. It is widely accepted that Beauharnais is probably no longer good law in light
of subsequent decisions limiting defamation actions. See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578
F.2d 1197, 1205 (7th Cir.) (suggesting that Beauharnais is no longer good law), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978); see also Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
§ 12-17, at 926-27 (2d ed. 1988). Nevertheless, the Court has not seized on numerous
opportunities to formally overturn Beauharnais. See Collin v. Smith, 439 U.S. 916, 919
(1978) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the Court
should have agreed to hear Collin because the case conflicted with Beauharnais,
which "ha[d] not been overruled or formally limited in any way"). Additionally, the
holding in Wisconsin v. Mitchell, discussed infra part II.B, suggests that the interest in
preventing potential racial violence, coupled with a history of racial strife, may again
be considered sufficient to justify a restriction on speech rights in order to prevent the
harmful conduct likely to result from fighting words.
75. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
76. Id. at 369, 372.
77. Id. at 370.
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the challenged statute and affirmed the conviction on the ground that
the purpose of the statute-to criminalize the mutilation of draft
cards-was unrelated to the suppression of "speech," and the defend-
ant's conduct plainly violated the statute.
78
Though it had just upheld O'Brien's draft card burning conviction
the previous year, in Street v. New York,7 9 the Supreme Court re-
versed a similar conviction for flag burning.80 The defendant, while
burning an American flag, stated in public: "'We don't need no damn
flag.' " Since the defendant's statement was not so inherently in-
flammatory as to be likely to cause others to retaliate violently, it did
not constitute fighting words and could not be the basis for the lower
court's verdict.' The Court was unable to determine from the record
whether the defendant was punished because of his conduct-burning
the flag-or his politically charged words,a3 and therefore, set aside
the conviction.'
78. Though O'Brien was not analyzed as a fighting words case, the Court set forth
a useful test for determining when conduct combined with speech may nevertheless
be punishable despite the incidental infringement on the right of free speech. See infra
part M.A (setting forth the test in O'Brien); infra part III.B (asserting that the Court
has in fact been applying the basic principles of the O'Brien test to fighting words as
early as in Chaplinsky).
79. 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
80. Id at 581. The decisions in O'Brien and Street were based on different stat-
utes, but the facts of the cases are similar. Both defendants were protesting govern-
ment conduct, or the lack of it. Each burned a symbolic object to express his
disapproval of his government's policy. Yet, arrests for essentially similar forms of
expression resulted in contrary results.
81. Id at 579. The defendant, upon hearing of the shooting of civil rights leader
James Meredith, took an American flag to a New York street corner and ignited it in
protest of the shooting. The defendant was arrested and charged with malicious mis-
chief under § 1425(16)(d) of the New York Penal Law, which made it a crime to
"'publicly mutilate, deface, defile, or defy, trample upon, or cast contempt upon
either by words or act [any flag of the United States].' "Id. at 578 (quoting N.Y. Penal
Law § 1425 (1909)).
82. Id. at 592. The Court noted that, even assuming that Street's remarks consti-
tuted fighting words, the challenged statute had not been narrowly drawn to punish
only fighting words, and the lower courts had failed to so construe the statute. Id.; see
also Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (striking down an overbroad statute
because it was not narrowly construed to apply only to words that had a direct ten-
dency to cause acts of violence).
83. Street, 394 U.S. at 590. The Court did not even consider whether the two ele-
ments of conduct and speech were in fact inseparable. Instead, it focused on the lan-
guage of the statute, which prohibited, in the same clause, mutilation of the flag or
contempt of the flag by words or act. Id. at 578. The defendant clearly violated the
law through his conduct of mutilating the flag and his casting of contempt upon the
flag by burning it. Yet, the Court focused on the possibility that the defendant was
arrested and convicted only on account of his words. Id. at 590.
84. Id. at 586. The Court analyzed the case under the principle set forth in
Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), stating that if a conviction is based on a
general verdict, and the record fails to show which clause of a statute the conviction
was based on, if one of the clauses of the statute is invalid, the conviction cannot
stand. Street, 394 U.S. at 585-86 (citing Stromberg, 283 U.S. at 367-68).
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That same year, the Court also decided Brandenburg v. Ohio,8 5
which involved a Ku Klux Klan leader who was convicted under the
Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act for advocating violence at a Klan
rally.86 The Supreme Court reversed the conviction by invalidating
the Act because it criminalized the mere advocacy of violence, as dis-
tinguished from "incitement to imminent lawless action." 87 Though
this doctrine of "imminent lawless action" is an exception to the First
Amendment, it has never been understood to constitute a category of
proscribable speech like libel, obscenity and fighting words.88 Despite
its similarity to the principles underlying the fighting words doctrine,89
The Court later invalidated another conviction for flag burning, in Texas v. John-
son, 491 U.S. 397 (1989). In that case, the Court directly addressed the speech/con-
duct issue. See infra text accompanying notes 114-21.
85. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Though Brandenburg was not a fighting words case, it is
included in this review because of its relevance in the development of the Court's
jurisprudence with regard to the fighting words doctrine.
86. Id. at 445. The defendant had addressed a meeting of the Ku Klux Klan that
was filmed by a television news reporter and later broadcast on local and national
news programs. Dressed in Klan regalia, the defendant addressed the following state-
ment to the rally: "[I]f our President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to
suppress the white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some
revengeance taken." Id. at 446. Other scattered phrases audible on the tape, though
not necessarily spoken by the defendant, included: "Bury the niggers"; "Send the
Jews back to Israel"; and "Nigger will have to fight for every inch he gets from now
on." Id. at 446 n.1.
The Act under which defendant was charged made it criminal to "'advocat[e]...
the duty, necessity, or propriety of crime, sabotage, violence, or unlawful methods of
terrorism as a means of accomplishing industrial or political reform' [and to] 'volunta-
rily assembl[e] with any society, group, or assemblage of persons formed to teach or
advocate the doctrines of criminal syndicalism.'" Id. at 444-45 (quoting Ohio Rev.
Code Ann. § 2923.13).
87. Id. at 449. Through a series of criminal syndicalism cases, the Court earlier
had derived the principle that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech ... do not
permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force ... except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting... imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action." Id. at 447 (referring to Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
516-17 (1951) (sustaining the constitutionality of the Smith Act, a criminal syndicalism
act, on the above principle) and Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 320-24 (1957)
(overturning a conviction under the Smith Act because the trial judge's jury instruc-
tions improperly allowed a conviction for the mere advocacy of violence)). This doc-
trine of "imminent lawless action" harkens back to the "clear and present danger"
test that was first articulated in the early twentieth century as a jurisprudential basis
to justify restrictions on speech in the service of another more important goal of
preventing violence. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
88. Perhaps this is yet another adventure in semantics, a fatefully appropriate and
ironic result in light of a constitutional amendment that was drafted to preserve, as
sacred, the right to free speech, while at the same time, ensure that language itself
remains vital and fluid. By focusing on "imminent lawless action," the Brandenburg
Court, 27 years after Chaplinsky, spoke directly to the conduct implications of speech,
rather than to speech itself. Brandenburg can be seen as a refinement of the proscrib-
able categories of speech, because, from the outset, the Court rejected the notion that
words directed to causing harmful conduct should be considered "speech" at all.
89. Essentially, the only difference between the two doctrines is the make-up of
the audience to whom the speaker is addressing his or her remarks. The paradig-
matic fighting words case involves a speaker who is hostile toward a particular ad-
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the Court always has applied the doctrine of "imminent lawless ac-
tion" explicitly as a proscription on conduct, not speech.90
It was not until the 1970s, however, that the Warren Court directly
attempted to clarify the important distinction between disorderly con-
duct and the expressive value that such activities may have in the con-
text of First Amendment principles of "free speech." In Cohen v.
California,9 1 the Court reversed the disorderly conduct conviction of a
Vietnam War protestor.92 The defendant was charged with disorderly
conduct after walking through the corridors of the Los Angeles
County Courthouse wearing a jacket bearing the message "Fuck the
Draft" on the back.93 Despite the fact that Cohen's activity might be
descriptively defined as conduct, and that the charge against him was
for disorderly conduct, the Supreme Court focused its analysis on the
nature of Cohen's expression.94 It determined that the slogan on Co-
dressee. Under the doctrine of imminent lawless action, the speaker addresses a
friendly audience and incites them to action. The principle goal underlying both doc-
trines, however, is the same-the prevention of breaches of the peace that may arise
from aggressively charged speech.
In Brandenburg, the fact pattern did not fit the fighting words paradigm because it
involved an audience of Klan members who were supportive of, not hostile to, the
speaker's views. 395 U.S. at 445. Thus, the Court needed a different mechanism to
apply the basic principle of fighting words. It, therefore, articulated the analogous
doctrine of imminent lawless action, which accommodated the facts in Brandenburg.
Cf Stephen W. Gard, Fighting Words as Free Speed, 58 Wash. U. LQ. 531, 537
(1980) (stating that although the two doctrines are comparable, "the personally abu-
sive epithet element [required of fighting words] focuses on the content of the words
uttered by the speaker.... [while] the requirement of a likelihood of a violent reac-
tion focuses on the circumstances in which the words are used").
90. See infra part III.B (arguing that the fighting words doctrine also has been
applied to prohibit conduct and not speech).
91. 403 U.S. 15 (1971). For a thoughtful discussion of Cohen, see William Cohen,
A Look Back at Cohen v. California, 34 UCLA L. Rev. 1595 (1987).
92. 403 U.S. at 26.
93. Id. at 16. The defendant was convicted under the part of California Penal
Code § 415 that made it a misdemeanor to "'maliciously and willfully disturb[ ] the
peace or quiet of any neighborhood or person [by] ... offensive conduct ... or use
any vulgar, profane, or indecent language within the presence or hearing of women or
children.'" Id. at 16 n.1 (quoting Cal. Penal Code § 415). Although the record stated
that women and children were "present in the corridor" through which Cohen
walked, the Los Angeles Municipal Court convicted the defendant under the first part
of the provision. Id. at 16.
The Court easily could have deemed the statute overbroad; it was susceptible to
overbroad interpretations and had not been authoritatively limited by the state court.
In fact, only three years after Cohen, the Court vacated and remanded another con-
viction under the same statute precisely because it determined that the statute was
overbroad. See Rosen v. California, 416 U.S. 924, 924 (1974); see also id. at 931
(Douglas, J., dissenting) (stating that he would have reversed the judgment because
the statute was overbroad and there had been no limiting construction by the state
court).
94. But cf 403 U.S. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (asserting that Cohen's
"absurd antic" was mainly conduct and little speech, and the Court's "agonizing over
First Amendment values seems misplaced and unnecessary").
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
hen's jacket was a political statement, not a personal insult.95 As a
political statement, the message had communicative value that was
protected by the First Amendment.96
The Court emphasized that the concept of "speech" is multifaceted
and that words themselves are only one of the elements that make up
"speech."'97 Moreover, it recognized that a speaker's choice of words
to convey a message may be as important for its emotive impact as for
its communicative value.98 The Court added that it is not for the gov-
ernment or the courts to determine how best to convey a message. 99
Thus, in Cohen, the Court rejected the government's attempt to pun-
ish Cohen's political message under the guise of a charge of disorderly
conduct.1"
Despite the Court's new interest in the nature of speech itself, in
two cases that followed Cohen, Gooding v. Wilson' and Lewis v. City
of New Orleans,"° the Court declined to review the circumstances
surrounding the challenged speech. Instead, it overturned the convic-
tions by deeming the statutes in those cases to be unconstitutionally
overbroad. 3 In Gooding, the defendant was one of a group picket-
95. Id. at 20. It is noteworthy that, like Cohen's message, the challenged expres-
sions in Chaplinsky, Terminiello, Feiner, O'Brien and Street were also political in na-
ture, but the Court chose not to make such a distinction in those cases.
96. Id. at 25-26.
97. See id. at 26. The Court stated that "much linguistic expression serves a dual
communicative function: it conveys not only ideas ... but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well." Id.
98. Id. Thus, the statements "Fuck the draft" and "I disagree vehemently with the
government's draft policy" may have similar communicative value, but no one would
argue that they are interchangeable. Yet, while thi former may resemble fighting
words and the latter does not, both statements are protected speech when spoken in
peaceful circumstances, which was precisely the situation in Cohen. See also Franklyn
S. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw. U. L.
Rev. 153, 189 (1972) (stating that with speech, its form and its content are so inextrica-
bly tied that the medium chosen to express a message is as integral an element of the
message as its substantive content).
99. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24. Speech may not be punished simply because the form it
takes is disturbing to the listener. After all, "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric."
Id. at 25; see also Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)(stating that "so long as the means are peaceful, the communication need not meet
standards of acceptability"). Moreover, "[tihe constitutional right of free expression
is ... designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of
public discussion, putting the decision ... largely in the hands of each of us ... ." 403
U.S. at 24. But see Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568 (1991) (holding that
the government interest in the societal disapproval of nude dancing is sufficient to
uphold a restriction on the expression of that activity).
100. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 23.
101. 405 U.S. 518 (1972).
102. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
103. To explain its reason for failing to consider the facts of each case, the Court
offered the following:
It matters not that the words [appellant] used might have been constitution-
ally prohibited under a narrowly and precisely drawn statute. At least when
statutes regulate or proscribe speech and when "no readily apparent con-
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ing in front of an army headquarters to protest American involvement
in Vietnam and blocking the doorway so that new recruits could not
enter the building."° Upon the group's refusal to cooperate with po-
lice and move away from the door, a scuffle ensued in which the de-
fendant committed an assault and battery against two police
officers." 5 Though the assault and battery charges were affirmed, the
defendant's conviction for use of "abusive language" was reversed by
the Supreme Court.1"6
The statute at issue prohibited the use of "opprobrious words or
abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace.""'m The
statute was comparable to the New Hampshire statute in Chaplin-
sky, 08 and the purpose of the statute comported with the purpose un-
derlying the fighting words doctrine. Nevertheless, the Court used
arcane and technical dictionary definitions of the terms "opprobrious"
and "abusive" to conclude that the statute restricted speech beyond
fighting words, and therefore, was unconstitutionally overbroad. 9
The Court was concerned with the possibility that, in addition to fight-
ing words, the statute may have had a chilling effect on protected
speech as well. In Gooding, the overbreadth considerations out-
weighed the actual violence that may have resulted from the verbal
exchange.
Similarly, in Lewis v. City of New Orleans,"0 an argument between
the defendant and a police officer precipitated the defendant's arrest
and conviction under a New Orleans ordinance that made it a crime
struction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes"... the
transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is
deemed to justify allowing "attacks on overly broad statutes with no require-
ment that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct
could not be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite narrow specific-
ity" . . . . This is deemed necessary because persons whose expression is
constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for
fear of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible of application to
protected expression.
Lewis, 415 U.S. at 133-34 (quoting and reaffirming holding in Gooding v. Wilson, 405
U.S. at 520-21).
104. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 519 n.1.
105. Id.
106. The indictment alleged that the defendant spoke the following phrases to spe-
cific officers: "White son of a bitch, I'll kill you... I'll choke you to death" and "You
son of a bitch, if you ever put your hands on me again, I'll cut you all to pieces." Id.
107. The Georgia statute, in relevant part, provided: "'Any person who shall, with-
out provocation, use to or of another, and in his presence.., opprobrious words or
abusive language, tending to cause a breach of the peace . . . shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor.'" Id at 519 (quoting Georgia Code Ann. § 26-6303).
108. See supra note 38; see also Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 137
(1974) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court's decision in Gooding to strike
down the statute because the language in the statute "virtually tracked the language
used by the Chaplinsky Court" in describing and outlawing the use of fighting words).
109. Gooding, 405 U.S. at 524-25.
110. 415 U.S. 130 (1974).
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"and a breach of the peace . . . to curse . .. or [use] opprobrious
language toward" an on-duty police officer. 1 ' The Court struck down
the statute because the Louisiana Supreme Court, on remand in light
of Gooding, failed to construe the statute adequately to apply only to
fighting words." 2 The use of the term "opprobrious," which was
deemed overbroad in Gooding, also made the New Orleans ordinance
impermissibly overbroad.1 3
The last case reviewed in this section is another flag burning case.
In Texas v. Johnson,"4 the Court overturned the defendant's convic-
tion for the "desecration of a venerated object" in violation of Texas
criminal law." 5 During the 1984 Republican National Convention,
the defendant, Gregory Lee Johnson, had ended a day long political
protest by burning an American flag in front of Dallas City Hall.'1 6
Though onlookers were offended by Johnson's gesture, there was no
threat of violence or riot. 17
The Supreme Court concluded that Johnson's conduct, which un-
doubtedly violated the statute, was expressive activity under the First
Amendment." 8 The flag desecration law was thus subject to strict
scrutiny." 9 The Court determined that the state's interest in preserv-
ing the flag as a symbol of nationhood could not justify infringing on
the defendant's First Amendment rights.' 20 Thus, although Johnson's
communication took the form of conduct, the Court treated it as pro-
tected expression. 2'
111. Id. at 132 (quoting New Orleans, La., Ordinance 828 M.C.S. § 49-7).
112. Id. at 132. But see id. at 138 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that the state
court on remand specifically construed the ordinance as narrowed to fighting words).
113. Id. at 132.
114. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
115. Id. at 400 n.1 (quoting Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 42.09 (West 1989) (prohibiting
the desecration of a national flag)).
116. Id. at 399. Demonstrators continued to chant "America, the red, white and
blue, we spit on you" while the flag burned. Id.
117. Id.
118. To reach that conclusion, the Court inquired whether" '[a]n intent to convey a
particularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood was great that the
message would be understood by those who viewed it.' "Id. at 404 (quoting Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974)). The state court already had dismissed the
government's argument that its goal was to prevent breaches of the peace because the
statute was not narrowly drawn to prohibit only those flag burnings likely to cause a
breach of the peace. Id. at 401. Moreover, the court stressed that another Texas stat-
ute specifically prohibited breaches of the peace. Id.
119. See infra note 200 (describing the strict scrutiny test).
120. While the statute prohibited burning a flag in a way that would denigrate its
value as a national symbol, it permitted other flag burnings, say for the purpose of
disposing of a dirty or torn flag. 491 U.S. at 411. The Court stated that "[i]f there is a
bedrock principle underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not
prohibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive
or disagreeable." Id. at 414 (citations omitted).
121. The following term, the Court struck down another flag burning conviction,
this time under the Flag Protection Act of 1989, which Congress had passed in re-
sponse to the Court's decision in Texas v. Johnson. See United States v. Eichman, 496
[Vol. 63
FIGHTING WORDS
The line of First Amendment cases described in this part suggests
that the Court has not been particularly successful in articulating a
standard for knowing when words are fighting words.'2 The appar-
ently anomalous results of these cases"z reflect the power of words to
mean different things in different situations. Nevertheless, one ele-
ment of the fighting words doctrine that the Court has developed and
refined since Chaplinsky is the significance of the addressee in relation
to the speaker of the fighting words.
B. The Import of the Addressee in Fighting Words
Although one element of the definition of fighting words requires a
face-to-face encounter, the Court in Chaplinsky did not directly ad-
dress this element. 24 The New Hampshire Supreme Court did con-
strue the language of the disorderly conduct statute to require that the
challenged words tend to cause violence "by the persons to whom,
individually, the remark is addressed."'" But the identity of the ad-
dressee, though clearly of some import to the drafters of the New
Hampshire statute, was not a central concern given the facts surround-
ing Chaplinsky's remarks. Because the defendant directed his
remarks to the city marshal, who was present to hear them, it was un-
necessary for the Court to focus on the "face-to-face" requirement."
Whether communications constitute fighting words, however, de-
pends in large part on the addressee of the communications. In subse-
quent cases, where the identity of a particular addressee was less
apparent, the Court was forced to analyze and interpret this element
of the fighting words doctrine. It had to locate a specifically identifi-
able person to whom the speaker's invitation to fight was directed. In
doing so, it further defined the scope of the doctrine by specifying,
through application, the types of circumstances in which expressive
communications could constitute fighting words.
U.S. 310, 312 (1990). The Court noted that "[a]lthough the Flag Protection Act con-
tains no explicit content-based limitation on the scope of prohibited conduct, it is
nevertheless clear that the Government's asserted interest is 'related to the suppres-
sion of free expression,' and concerned with the content of such expression." Id. at
315 (quoting Johnson, 491 U.S. at 410).
122. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (suggesting that words themselves
cannot be fighting words without reference to the circumstances in which they are
spoken).
123. See infra part I.C (discussing the inconsistencies in the cases reviewed in part
I.A).
124. The Court stated only that the statute prohibited "the face-to-face words
plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee." Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
125. Id
126. Id at 569. The remark about the government of Rochester was also directed
to the marshal, who was the government's representative. Id Professor Tribe has
suggested that the Chaplinsky Court "focused primarily on the content of the commu-
nication without closely examining the context within which it was uttered." Tribe,
supra note 74, § 12-10, at 850.
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In Cohen v. California,127 the Court acknowledged that the four-
letter expletive on Cohen's jacket commonly is used in a provocative
manner.12s But it noted that in this instance, "[n]o individual actually
or likely to be present could reasonably have regarded the words on
appellant's jacket as a direct personal insult."' 29 Moreover, "the mere
presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve
automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving of-
fense."' 30 The government had to show more than an interest in pro-
tecting passersby, who could protect themselves by averting their eyes
or walking away.13' The communication had to be directed at some-
one in particular in order to trigger retaliation by that addressee.132
The burden would be on the government to show that the addressee
was in some way "powerless to avoid [the expressive] conduct. '133
In several subsequent cases in which the Court overturned fighting
words convictions on the basis of overbroad statutes, the Court em-
phasized that fighting words must "'have a direct tendency to cause
acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the remark is
addressed.' ,,134 Though the Chaplinsky Court had articulated an ob-
jective standard by which to measure fighting words, 3 5 the cases sug-
127. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
128. Id. at 20. The Court implied that in certain face-to-face circumstances, the
expletive on Cohen's jacket could be communicated in a manner meant to incite an-
other to retaliate. Id.
129. Id.; see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 409 (1989) (burning an American
flag in public could not be considered fighting words because no reasonable onlooker
would have viewed the expressive activity as "a direct personal insult or an invitation
to exchange fisticuffs"); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 107 (1973) (defendant's state-
ment "We'll take the fucking street later" was not a personal insult because it was not
directed at a particular individual).
130. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21.
131. Id.
132. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 309 (1940) (stating that provocative
words must be "directed to the person of the hearer").
133. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 22. The Court stated that "[t]he ability of government,
consonant with the Constitution, to shut off discourse solely to protect others from
hearing it is... dependent upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are being
invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." Id. at 21; see Erznoznik v. City of Jack-
sonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (stating that the government may protect listeners
from offensive speech, but "only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the
home," or the listener cannot practically avoid exposure).
134. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524 (1972) (citation omitted); see Lewis v.
City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133-34 (1974) (discussed infra text accompanying
notes 137-40); Brown v. Oklahoma, 408 U.S. 914, 914 (1972) (remanding, in light of
Cohen and Gooding, case in which defendant used the word "motherfucking" at a
public meeting); Rosenfeld v. New Jersey, 408 U.S. 901, 902-03 (1972) (same).
135. The Court cited to the state court's description of the test as "'what men of
common intelligence would understand would be words likely to cause an average
addressee to fight.' " Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942) (quoting
18 A.2d 754, 762 (N.H. 1941)).
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gest that the Court was not willing to rely on a purely objective
standard. 136
For example, in Lewis v. City of New Orleans, the statute had a
limited application: prohibiting offensive language spoken to an on-
duty police officer.137 The case established that it was unconstitu-
tional to make it a per se crime to address profanities to an on-duty
police officer. But it did not address directly whether fighting words
were punishable "when addressed to a police officer trained to exer-
cise a higher degree of restraint than the average citizen."13 Scholars
have suggested that the standard is not and should not be the original
"objective" standard of the reasonable addressee.1 39 Rather, courts
should apply the standard of a reasonable person in the position of the
addressee."4 Such a result is consistent with the idea that words
136. See, eg., Gooding, 405 U.S. at 528 (stating that "the standard allowing juries to
determine guilt 'measured by common understanding and practice' does not limit the
application of [the challenged statute] to 'fighting' words defined by Chaplinsky");
see also Thomas F. Shea, "Don't Bother to Smile When You Call Me That"-Fighting
Words and the First Amendment, 63 Ky. LJ. 1, 15 (1975) (claiming that Gooding es-
sentially overruled Chaplinsky).
137. Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 132 (1974).
138. Id at 132 n.2. Justice Powell, concurring, suggested that the standard may not
be the objective standard articulated in Chaplinsky. Powell stated that "Ji]t is unlikely
... that the words said to have been used here would have precipitated a physical
confrontation between the middle-aged woman who spoke them and the police of-
ficer in whose presence they were uttered." Id at 135 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice
Powell questioned whether or not the words could even constitute fighting words be-
cause police officers should exercise a higher level of self-restraint. Id.
This inquiry is a clear departure from a consideration of the average addressee in
Chaplinsky. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 462-63 (1987) (considering
whether a police officer should be held to a higher standard of restraint by using a
subjective test based on the likely reaction of the particular addressee); Ashton v.
Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195, 200 (1966) (same); see also Note, The Demise of the Chaplin-
sky Fighting Words Doctrine: An Argument For Its Interment, 106 Harv. L Rev. 1129,
1135-37 (1993) [hereinafter Demise of Chaplinsky] (arguing that the objective stan-
dard in Chaplinsky has not been applied in actual cases).
139. See Shea, supra note 136, at 14 (arguing that the Court altered the fighting
words doctrine by adopting a subjective standard to determine the likelihood of retal-
iation from the addressee); Strossen, supra note 21, at 509 (asserting that the Court
narrowed the definition of fighting words to the second prong-words likely to cause
a breach of the peace-and required a contextual evaluation of each challenged utter-
ance); Tribe, supra note 74, § 12-18, at 929 & n.9 (describing a doctrinal shift in the
development of fighting words by incorporating into the standard the "clear and pres-
ent danger test"); cf. Gard, supra note 89, at 554-56 (asserting that the Court has
continued to apply an objective standard, but has placed the objective "reasonable
person" in the circumstances of the addressee).
140. Other scholars have suggested that even the requirement of likely retaliatory
conduct does not adequately accommodate the range of possible responses to fighting
words. See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Insults and Epithets: Are They Protected Speech?,
42 Rutgers L. Rev. 287,296-97 (1990) (suggesting that the age of the victim of abusive
epithets, and thus the likelihood of retaliation, should not be relevant in determining
whether the words are punishable); Lawrence, supra note 21, at 453-55 (observing
that in cases where minorities are outnumbered by their victimizers, they are more
likely to flee than to fight back, a response that the objective standard of fighting
words does not adequately accommodate); Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2355-56 &
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themselves are innocent until exploited in circumstances where partic-
ular addressees are likely to retaliate.
C. The Crisis in Conflicting Results in Fighting Words Cases
Arguably, since Chaplinsky, the Court has narrowed the scope of
the fighting words doctrine through a case-by-case analysis, and the
doctrine has evolved from a speech restrictive doctrine to one that
protects a great deal of unpopular speech. In each case, the Court
determined, based on the facts presented, whether the statute was
narrowly construed to prohibit only fighting words, and if so, whether
the challenged expression constituted fighting words. In the process,
the original two-pronged definition of fighting words as those words
likely "to inflict injury or cause a breach of the peace" has all but
collapsed, so that the doctrine now more closely resembles the more
basic "clear and present danger" test. 4'
This theory, though precise and neat, does not account for apparent
inconsistencies in the Court's overall analysis of the cases and the con-
trary results of seemingly similar cases. The Court's decisions do not
trace an evolving doctrinal development of fighting words. Thus, the
decisions in these confusing cases often seem arbitrary and
unprincipled.
Similar circumstances often resulted in contrary holdings.' 42 For ex-
ample, the defendants in Terminiello v. Chicago and Feiner v. New
York both were speaking about politically charged issues before large
crowds. 143 Yet in Terminiello, where the disturbances erupted on ac-
count of the defendant's incitements,144 the Court reversed the charge
of disorderly conduct because of an improper jury instruction to which
neither the defense attorney nor the appellate courts had objected. 145
In Feiner, on the other hand, the defendant was lawfully congregating
on a street corner that was regularly used for public gatherings, and
his speech incited no actual violence. Nevertheless, the Court af-
firmed the conviction on the grounds of disorderly conduct. 41 The
circumstances in Terminiello presented just as likely an occasion for
violence as those in Feiner, and yet the Court decided the cases con-
n.191 (noting that retaliatory violence as the standard for when words become fight-
ing words does not account for victims who are silenced in a "demoralized, passive
state").
141. See Philip Weinberg, R.A.V. and Mitchell: Making Hate Crime a Trivial Pur-
suit, 25 Conn. L. Rev. 299, 314 (1993); Demise of Chaplinsky, supra note 138, at 1133
n.34.
142. Compare Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949) with Feiner v. New York,
340 U.S. 315 (1951).
143. See supra text accompanying notes 53 and 61.
144. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
145. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
146. Feiner, 340 U.S. at 322 n.2 (Black, J., dissenting); see supra note 67.
147. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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trarily. These anomalous results seem to cast doubt upon the Court's
willingness to apply the fighting words doctrine with consistency and
reasoned judgment.
Other times, the Court interpreted similar statutes differently and
arrived at contrary holdings. For example, in Street v. New York, one
subsection of the statute was deemed unconstitutional. 148 Since the
conviction was a general one, and the Court was unable to determine
under which subsection the defendant was convicted, it relied on the
Stromberg analysis to overturn the conviction.14 9
The same problem presented itself in Feiner v. New York. The chal-
lenged statute had several clauses,' 50 and it was unclear under which
of the clauses the defendant had been convicted. Clauses one and
two, which prohibited offensive, abusive or annoying language or be-
havior, could easily have been construed as overbroad because their
language was strikingly similar to the New Hampshire statute in
Chaplinsky, but without any narrowing construction. Regarding the
third clause, which prohibited congregating on public streets in defi-
ance of a police officer's request to move, even the trial judge agreed
that the defendant's public address was a lawful one.' 5 ' Under the
circumstances, the Court could have ruled that, like in Street, the gen-
eral conviction could not stand. Yet, the Court was unconcerned with
the details of the conviction and affirmed the lower court. Again,
there appears to be no principled explanation for the Court's choice to
apply the Stromberg analysis in one case, but not in the other.
In yet other cases, the Court relied on the doctrine of overbreadth
to strike down statutes without even considering a defendant's chal-
lenged behavior.'52 For example, in Gooding v. Wilson,'53 the Court
struck down a breach of the peace statute despite the fact that the law
closely resembled the New Hampshire statute in Chaplinsky and was
understood by the parties, and the lower courts, to apply only to fight-
ing words. 4 Yet in other instances, such as in Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois55 and in Cohen v. California,156 the Court focused on the nature
of the behavior and the content of the speech with no more than a
reference to the possible deficiencies of the statutes.
Additionally, the Court's distinction between speech and conduct
also appears arbitrary. For example, the defendants' activities in Co-
hen v. California and Texas v. Johnson were considered expressive
148. See supra note 82. For a discussion of Street, see supra notes 79-84 and accom-
panying text.
149. See supra note 84 (describing the Stromberg analysis).
150. For a text of the New York statute in Feiner, see supra note 61.
151. See supra note 67.
152. See supra note 103.
153. For a discussion of Gooding, see supra notes 104-09 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
155. For a discussion of Beauharnais, see supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
156. For a discussion of Cohen, see supra notes 91-100 and accompanying text.
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conduct protected by the First Amendment. 57 Yet in O'Brien, where
the defendant was similarly exercising his speech rights, the Court
found that the activity was primarily conduct that could be restricted.
The Court could have concluded that O'Brien's draft card burning
was also protected expressive conduct, but it neglected to consider
that option. 58
The simplest means to justify the Court's decisionmaking in this
area is to distinguish each case on the facts presented. Although this
approach will explain some of the Court's decisions, it does not ac-
count for the rest. Every case is unique factually, but this is too sim-
plistic an explanation because it says little about what principles the
Court employed in reaching its conclusions. Neither does it account
for the practical reality that the Court hears only a small percentage of
the cases for which certiorari is filed, and its decisions at least should
provide guiding principles for the lower courts to follow.
Another possible explanation is to distinguish the cases on the basis
of the statutes presented in each. Since the Court is limited to decid-
ing the case before it 159 and is bound by a state court's construction of
the statute or ordinance at issue, it has no choice but to determine first
the validity of the specific law. This explanation would resolve why
the Court never reached the factual issues in some cases. But it does
not explain why the Court concluded that some statutes were over-
broad despite state court limiting constructions,160 while others suf-
fered from a trial judge's overly broad charge to a jury.161 It also does
not explain why the language in some statutes, though clearly analo-
gous to the New Hampshire statute in Chaplinsky, could not be under-
stood to prohibit the same fighting words that the Court deemed
proscribable in Chaplinsky.
One last explanation for these apparent discrepancies in the Court's
holdings is related to the timing of the decisions. In periods of war,
the Court appears to have been more inclined to permit restrictions
on speech. As far back as 1798,162 and certainly during World War
1,163 World War 1164 and the conflict in Vietnam, the Court permitted
restrictions on speech that it otherwise might not have upheld. Thus,
while the Court upheld Chaplinsky's conviction in 1942, it struck
down Terminiello's conviction in 1949, despite the fact that both cases
157. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text; supra note 118 and accompany-
ing text.
158. See infra part IlI.A.
159. See U.S. Const, art. III, § 2.
160. See Gooding v, Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 524-25 (1972).
161. See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949).
162. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
164. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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presented similar circumstances, and, in the latter case, there was a
real possibility of a violent eruption."
Similarly, the Court upheld O'Brien's conviction in 1968, but struck
down Street's conviction one year later, despite the fact that each pro-
test burning was intended and understood by viewers to communicate
a political message.1 66 Street's protest, however, was not explicitly re-
lated to Vietnam, 67 while O'Brien's protest was in direct defiance of
the government's military policy. 16
While the preceding explanations may offer some insight into the
Court's decisions in this area, they do not justify or make those deci-
sions any more principled. This gap in understanding is ultimately
unsatisfactory because it suggests a lack of coherent and reasoned
judgment on the part of the Court. But perhaps the Court's somewhat
erratic pattern of fighting words decisions may be attributable to a
larger framework or overriding principle that goes unacknowledged,
but nonetheless operates as a driving force behind the Court's
jurisprudence. 69
II. Two DISTINCTIVE CASES
The line of fighting words-related cases that followed Chaplinsky
appear to use an assortment of First Amendment principles to reverse
some convictions and uphold others. Two recent hate crime cases,
R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul170 and Mitchell v. Wisconsin,17 1 illustrate this
apparent lack of a coherent jurisprudence.
A. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul
In June 1992, the Supreme Court struck down a St. Paul ordinance
that prohibited fighting words' 72 on the "'basis of race, color, creed,
religion or gender.' "17 The defendant, Robert Viktora, along with
several other teenagers, had burned a cross on an African-American
family's lawn. The City of St. Paul prosecuted Viktora under its Bias-
165. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
166. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (describing the Court's test in
Spence to determine if conduct is intended as an expressive communication).
167. See supra note 81.
168. See supra text accompanying note 77; cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971). Cohen's protest march through the corridors of a courthouse, like O'Brien's
draft card burning, clearly was related to the government's policy regarding Vietnam.
But the Court upheld O'Brien's conviction and struck down Cohen's because, despite
their similar expressive content, O'Brien's form of conduct was itself punishable,
while Cohen's was not.
169. See infra part IH.
170. 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992).
171. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
172. The Court adopted the Minnesota Supreme Court's narrow construction of
the ordinance to apply only to the proscribable category of fighting words, but still
found the ordinance facially invalid. See 112 S. Ct. at 2542.
173. Id at 2541 (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
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Motivated Crime Ordinance. 174 Though Justice Scalia noted in the
last words of the Court's opinion that "burning a cross in someone's
front yard is reprehensible,' 75  the Court ultimately reversed
Viktora's conviction on the grounds that the ordinance unconstitu-
tionally prohibited speech on the basis of the content of the idea
expressed.
17 6
Justice Scalia reasoned that even if the ordinance reached only un-
protected fighting words, St. Paul could not constitutionally regulate
only some kinds of fighting words on the basis of the content of the
intended message. 177 The ordinance was unconstitutional because it
restricted in a content-discriminatory manner only those speakers who
expressed views on particular "disfavored subjects" that were listed in
the ordinance. 178 Fighting words based on another unlisted subject,
such as sexual orientation, political affiliation or a physical disability,
would go unpunished under the ordinance. 179 By not prohibiting all
fighting words, but only those of a particularly noxious content, the St.
Paul ordinance ran afoul of the Constitution. The point of the First
Amendment, Justice Scalia wrote, is that "majority preferences must
be expressed in some fashion other than silencing speech on the basis
of its content."' 80
1. The Court's Opinion
In R.A.V., the majority established a "rule"'' that "[c]ontent-based
regulations are presumptively invalid."'82 The rationale presented for
174. The St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance provided:
"Whoever places on public or private property a symbol, object, appellation,
characterization or graffiti, including, but not limited to, a burning cross or
Nazi swastika, which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses
anger, alarm or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, reli-
gion or gender commits disorderly conduct and shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor."
Id. (quoting St. Paul, Minn., Legis. Code § 292.02 (1990)).
175. Id. at 2550.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 2545; see infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
178. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547. Not only did the Court conclude that the ordinance
was unconstitutionally content-based, but it also determined that the ordinance was
viewpoint discriminatory; it favored those who advocated "racial, color, etc." toler-
ance, but condemned those who might oppose such tolerance and might choose to
speak out on their views. Id. at 2547-48.
179. Id. at 2547.
180. Id. at 2548.
181. See Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev.
1175, 1178-83 (1989) (explaining why bright line "rules" are superior to "standards").
For an excellent discussion of the rules/standards distinction, see Kathleen M. Sulli-
van, The Supreme Court 1991 Term: Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards,
106 Harv. L. Rev. 22, 57-69 (1992).
182. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2542. Under this rule, the Court found the St. Paul ordi-
nance invalid even though the class of speech at issue, fighting words, historically had
been "unprotected" by the First Amendment. Justice Scalia's only explanation for
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this general principle was that content discrimination "'rais[es] the
specter that the Government may effectively drive certain ideas or
viewpoints from the marketplace.' ,,s In the case of speech that is
already proscribable, however, content discrimination often poses no
threat of government censorship." 4 Justice Scalia noted that in three
instances, regulation of proscribable speech may be constitutionally
content-based. The first is "[w]hen the basis for the content discrimi-
nation consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at
issue is proscribable. '' 1as The second is when the subclass of proscrib-
able speech is "associated with the particular 'secondary effects' of the
speech, so that the regulation is 'justified without reference to the con-
tent of the . . . speech.' "186 The third is when a "content-based sub-
category.., can be swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute
this anomaly was that previous cases that deemed fighting words unprotected should
not be taken literally. See id. at 2543. But see Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 397-
98 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (describing fighting words as "statements that we
have previously held entitled to no First Amendment protection").
183. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2545 (citations omitted).
184. Id
185. Id For example, "the Federal Government can criminalize only those threats
of violence that are directed against the President, since the reasons why threats of
violence are outside the First Amendment ... have special force when applied to the
person of the President." Id. at 2546 (citation omitted).
St. Paul's ordinance arguably falls into this exception because the very reason why
fighting words are outside the First Amendment has special force when applied to
racial and other minorities. See Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2201 (1993); see
also Delgado, supra note 22, at 136-39 (asserting that the physical and psychological
harm of racist speech is uniquely significant); Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2335-41
(same); The Honorable John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 Yale LJ.
1293, 1311 (1993) (suggesting that "racial, religious, and gender-based invectives can
cause distinct and especially grievous injury, particularly when used by members of a
powerful group against an individual already disadvantaged by a hostile
environment").
186. RA.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546 (alteration in original) (quoting Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986)).
In Renton, the Court ruled that the challenged ordinance, which prohibited the
location of an adult theater within "1,000 feet of any residential zone.., church, park,
or school," 475 U.S. at 46, was "completely consistent with [the] definition of 'con-
tent-neutral' speech regulations as those that 'are justified without reference to the
content.'" Id. at 48 (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)). The Court noted that "even if this were a
case involving a special governmental response to the content of one type of movie,"
it would still be upheld as constitutional on the grounds that the government may
draw content-based distinctions when special interests are concerned. Id. at 49 (citing
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 82 n.6 (1976) (Powell, J., concur-
ring)). But see Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utils. Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986)
(plurality opinion) (decided on the same day as Renton, but contrarily stating that
time, place and manner restrictions must still be content-neutral to be valid).
In R.A.V., the Court ultimately admitted that the zoning ordinance in Renton was
in fact a content-based regulation. 112 S. Ct. at 2546. Even there, however, the Court
merely relabeled that type of regulation from "content-neutral" to "content-based,"
and then excepted it from the new per se rule against content-based regulations. Id.
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directed at conduct rather than speech."' 87 Finally, the Court added a
catchall exception to the rule against content-based restrictions: a reg-
ulation need not be content-neutral when "the nature of the content
discrimination is such that there is no realistic possibility that official
suppression of ideas is afoot."' 88
The majority claimed that St. Paul's facially content-based ordi-
nance did not fit into any of the above exceptions. 89 The Court con-
ceded that St. Paul may have a compelling interest in preventing the
harmful effects of bias-related crimes, such as cross burnings. But, it
asserted, the "existence of adequate content-neutral alternatives"
made it unnecessary even to consider whether the ordinance could be
upheld under any of the exceptions to the rule.' 90
2. The Departure from Established First Amendment
Jurisprudence
According to the concurring Justices, the Court's reasoning "re-
quire[d] serious departures from the teaching of prior cases,"' 91 and it
did so "without providing a coherent replacement theory."'" Justices
White, Blackmun and Stevens criticized the majority for failing to de-
cide the case according to settled "overbreadth" doctrine.193 Addi-
tionally, Justice White asserted that the majority abandoned the
categorical approach, 194 which has been a "firmly entrenched part of
our First Amendment jurisprudence."' 95 Justice Stevens rejected both
187. Id. (citing United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968)). The Court
claimed that Title VII's prohibition against sexual discrimination in employment is a
permissible rule that might encompass a content-based proscription of only sexually
derogatory fighting words. See infra part III (arguing that fighting words regulations
may be understood as regulating conduct under O'Brien); infra part IV (suggesting
that a statute to prohibit certain uniquely harmful types of fighting words, modeled on
the language of Title VII, would be constitutional).
188. 112 S. Ct. at 2547. The Court suggested that a content-based prohibition of
only those obscene movies with blue-eyed actresses would not trigger any First
Amendment scrutiny. Id. The problem with the Court's catchall exception is that it
has the potential to encompass prohibitions far more suspect than the Court's fantas-
tical example, and therefore, in its extreme, to swallow the rule.
189. Id. at 2548-49. But see supra notes 185-87 and accompanying text.
190. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550 (citing Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988)).
191. Id. at 2551 (White, J., concurring).
192. Id. at 2560 (White, J., concurring).
193. For a description of the overbreadth doctrine, see supra note 56.
The concurrences would have invalidated the St. Paul ordinance on the grounds
that, despite the state court's narrowing construction, the ordinance still reached
speech that merely annoyed others but did not rise to the level of fighting words. See
112 S. Ct. at 2559 (White, J., concurring).
Justice White also noted that the Court lacked jurisdiction to decide the case on the
majority's rationale because the majority's theory of content-based restrictions was
never argued before Minnesota's highest court, or even before the Supreme Court. Id.
at 2551 & n.2 (White, J., concurring).
194. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
195. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2552 (White, J., concurring). White asserted that the
Court has long held certain discrete categories of expression to be proscribable on the
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the majority's and White's "absolute" principles in favor of a multi-
faceted analysis that would account for relevant factors, including the
content and context of the speech and the nature of the regulation.
196
It is arguable whether a decision based on the doctrine of over-
breadth would have been instructive to lower courts seeking guidance
from the Supreme Court on how to analyze hate crime laws. t97 The
Court apparently viewed the problem with St. Paul's ordinance as
more than sloppy drafting. Had the Court used this case to overturn
or redefine fighting words as a proscribable category of speech, argua-
bly there would have been good reason to reject thereafter the simple
solution of overbreadth in favor of a more substantial overhaul.' 98
This, however, was not the case; although the Court did not overturn
the doctrine entirely, it failed to articulate a new definition for the old
category of fighting words. Instead, it articulated a broad rule against
content-based restrictions on speech, without considering that the rule
might, in its future application, sweep more broadly than intended and
thereby restrict otherwise protected speech. 199
basis of their content. Id In particular, Justice White still subscribed to the notion
that fighting words are a proscribable category of speech because their evil content is
unworthy of Frst Amendment protection. Id. Justice White argued that it is inconsis-
tent to proscribe an entire category of speech because its content is evil, but not allow
government to treat a subset of that proscribable category differently without violat-
ing the First Amendment. Id at 2553; see also id at 2562 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(stating that "the Court's revision of the categorical approach seems to me something
of an adventure in a doctrinal wonderland").
196. See id at 2566-67 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens argued that the
Court properly rejected the absolute nature of the categorical approach, but wrongly
embraced a "rule" approach. For Stevens, no absolute rule could adequately encom-
pass the complex nature of speech. Id at 2567. Moreover, in this case, the Court's
rule required the grandfathering of so many exceptions to account for established
caselaw as to make the rule more like an arbitrary standard. Id. at 2564-65 (Stevens,
J., concurring) (asserting that the Court, upon recognizing that it has turned First
Amendment law "on its head," "quickly offers some ad hoe limitations on its newly
extended prohibition on content-based regulations"); id. at 2556 (White, J., concur-
ring) (stating that "[t]he Court has patched up its argument with an apparently nonex-
haustive list of ad hoc exceptions").
197. Despite its limited capacity for guidance in the area of fighting words, the
Court has often used the overbreadth doctrine to overturn laws prohibiting fighting
words. See, e.g., Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 6 (1949) (involving the application
of a fighting words construction to a breach of the peace statute that ultimately did
not save the statute from overbreadth).
198. A critical overhaul of the fighting words doctrine may have been in order be-
cause of its apparent limited usefulness. See Demise of Chaplinsky, supra note 138, at
1141-46 (arguing that the Court should overturn the fighting words doctrine).
199. In explaining his preference for general rules, Justice Scalia has admitted that
rules are inherently imprecise as compared to standards, which take into account the
factual circumstances of a case. But he appeared unconcerned about those marginal
cases that might be wrongly decided because a bright line rule failed to consider suffi-
ciently the facts of the case. See Scalia, supra note 181, at 1183.
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The Court also offered no legitimate explanation for "discarding
[the] firmly established strict scrutiny analysis. ' '200 With some excep-
tions,2° ' the use of a strict scrutiny analysis presupposes an outcome of
invalidity of the challenged law and is thus akin to a bright line rule.2°
Therefore, the "strict scrutiny" test should have fit snugly within the
framework of Scalia's rules-based analysis. Moreover, the Court con-
ceded that St. Paul's interests were compelling and that the ordinance
promoted those interests.0 3 The Court nevertheless failed to apply
the test. Instead, the Court rationalized that the existence of adequate
content-neutral alternatives undercut any defense of the ordinance.204
Finally, Justice Stevens criticized the Court's new per se rule against
content-based regulations. The notion that distinctions on the basis of
content are per se invalid, Stevens observed, has a "simplistic appeal,
but lacks support in our First Amendment jurisprudence. 2 5 Stevens
asserted that "content-based distinctions, far from being presump-
tively invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a coherent
understanding of the First Amendment. '2 6 The status of speech as
200. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2555 (White, J., concurring). When deciding the constitu-
tionality of a regulation implicating a fundamental right, the Court has used a two-
tiered "strict scrutiny" analysis to consider: whether the regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest, and if so, whether it is narrowly tailored to achieve
that end. See id. at 2554.
Justice White contended that under the majority's view, a narrowly drawn content-
based ordinance could never withstand "strict scrutiny" if its purpose could be accom-
plished by banning a wider category of speech. Thus, the majority not only failed to
apply the test in this case, but effectively abandoned this "fundamental tool" of analy-
sis. Id.
201. Six months prior to the decision in R.A.V., the Court, with Justice Scalia con-
curring, applied the strict scrutiny test to a content-based statute implicating First
Amendment rights. See Burson v. Freeman, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 1858 (1992) (upholding,
under a strict scrutiny analysis, a prohibition of voter solicitation and distribution of
campaign materials within 100 feet of a polling entrance). Justice Scalia offered nojustification for failing to apply the same analysis in R.A.V.
202. See Scalia, supra note 181, at 1178-79.
203. R.A.V, 112 S. Ct. at 2549. Thus, the Court conceivably could have concluded
that the ordinance could withstand strict scrutiny analysis.
204. Id. at 2550. More likely, the Court "manipulated doctrine to strike down an
ordinance whose premise it opposed." Id. at 2560 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice
Blackmun observed that the Court's motivation was not the preservation of values
underlying the First Amendment, but rather a fear of progressive notions of political
correctness and cultural diversity. Id. Consequently, the Court never considered
whether First Amendment values actually would be compromised by prohibiting in-
timidation in the form of cross burning. See id.
205. Id. at 2566 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens properly criticized the Court's
reliance on Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), for the proposition
that content-based regulations are presumptively invalid. 112 S. Ct. at 2563 (Stevens,
J., concurring). In that case, "the Court indicated that Chicago's selective proscrip-
tion of nonlabor picketing was not per se unconstitutional, but rather could be upheld
if the City demonstrated that nonlabor picketing was 'clearly more disruptive than
[labor] picketing.'" Id. (quoting Mosley, 408 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added)).
206. Id. at 2563 (Stevens, J., concurring). Stevens listed several examples of cases
in which the Court has upheld content-based restrictions, including FCC v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion) (upholding a restriction on the broad-
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protected or proscribable always has been determined by its con-
tent.207 Additionally, the level at which a particular kind of speech is
protected also depends upon its subject matter. For example, speech
about public officials is protected at a higher level than speech about
private individuals.3" Clearly, regulations that distinguish between
types of speech are content-based, and yet the Court has upheld them
as constitutional.' °
In the case of the St. Paul ordinance, which prohibited fighting
words based on race, color, creed, religion or gender, the identities of
the speaker and the addressee are, and should be, relevant factors in
determining whether speech violates the ordinance. Even under a
general fighting words ordinance, these same factors would be rele-
vant in determining if the challenged expression constituted fighting
words.210 If fighting words based on the disfavored topics listed in the
St. Paul ordinance do cause distinct harm,211 there seems little reason
to prohibit St. Paul from listing those subjects in the ordinance, espe-
cially if it is truly interested in protecting those targeted groups.
Prior to R.A.V., the Court never had applied a rule of content-neu-
trality to invalidate a regulation aimed at criminalizing constitution-
ally unprotected speech. 12 Both reason and precedent governed
cast of specific indecent words) and Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973) (up-
holding a restriction on the speech of state employees with regard to partisan political
matters). 112 S. Ct. at 2563-64; see also Near v. Minnesota ex reL Olson, 283 U.S. 697,
716 (1931) (holding that in war time, "the publication of the sailing dates of trans-
ports or the number and location of troops" may be restricted although the publica-
tion of other war related information would be protected under the First
Amendment).
207. 112 S. Ct. at 2563 (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Stevens' point is that even
with categorical absolutes, it is impossible to talk about speech regulations without
talking about the content of the speech. Id For instance, even fighting words have
content, and their prohibition is often based on this content. But that has never
before taken fighting words out of the category of proscribable speech. See Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 66 (1976) (stating that "it is the content of
the utterance that determines whether it is a protected epithet or an unprotected
'fighting comment' ").
208. 112 S. Ct. at 2563 (Stevens, J., concurring).
209. See supra note 206. Stevens' rationale for the inevitability of content-based
regulations on speech is analogous to his critique of the majority's bright line rule for
speech. Bright line rules simply cannot be applied effectively to speech without refer-
ence to the content of the speech. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also
pp. 829-30. According to Stevens, even a general restriction on fighting words is con-
tent-based, because applying it to a challenged statement requires an analysis of the
content of the statement and the context of the circumstances in which that statement
is made. 112 S. Ct. at 2566-67 (Stevens, J., concurring).
210. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 569 (1942).
211. Compare this Note, which advocates that the conduct implications of certain
fighting words cause distinct harms with Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2336-38 (sug-
gesting that the words themselves cause distinct psychological harms).
212. Even in the area of protected speech, the Court has stated that "it is not rare
that a content-based classification of speech has been accepted because... within the
confines of the given classification, the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly out-
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against doing so in R.A.V. The Court, nonetheless, declined to over-
turn Viktora's conviction on either of the settled First Amendment
grounds of overbreadth or strict scrutiny, and instead, applied its new
rule.
B. Wisconsin v. Mitchell
Following the Court's decision in R.A.V., state courts attempted to
follow and apply R.A.V. in First Amendment cases.2 13 For example,
on the basis of its understanding of R.A.V., the Wisconsin Supreme
Court reversed the aggravated battery conviction of a black teenager
whose penalty was increased because his beating of a white boy was
bias-motivated. 14 The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the pen-
alty enhancement statute used to increase Mitchell's maximum pen-
alty from two to seven years215 violated the First Amendment because
it punished offensive thought.216
weighs the expressive interests . . . that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
required." New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982).
213. See, e.g., State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 459 (Ohio 1992) (striking down an
"ethnic intimidation" statute because it impermissibly infringed on First Amendment
speech rights), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993), rev'd, 624 N.E.2d 722
(1994); State v. Plowman, 838 P.2d 558, 564-65 (Or. 1992) (en banc) (upholding Ore-
gon's content-based "intimidation" law and distinguishing it from the St. Paul ordi-
nance in R.A.V. as a proscription on conduct, not speech); State v. Talley, 858 P.2d
217, 230-31 (Wash. 1993) (striking down the content-based provision of a hate crime
statute, which specified cross burning and defacement of property with certain types
of symbols as per se violations, because the provision, even if construed to prohibit
only fighting words, was overbroad); State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807, 817 (Wis.)
(striking down a content-based penalty enhancement statute because it impermissibly
punished offensive thought), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993).
214. See State v. Mitchell, 485 N.W.2d 807 (1992) (Mitchell I), rev'd, 113 S. Ct. 2194
(1993) (Mitchell II). The defendant, along with a group of teenagers, was discussing a
scene from the film "Mississippi Burning" in which a white man beats a young black
boy. Mitchell II, 113 S. Ct. at 2196. Mitchell asked his friends: "Do you all feel hyped
up to move on some white people?" and "You all want to fuck somebody up? There
goes a white boy; go get him." Id. at 2196-97. Mitchell and his friends proceeded to
beat a white boy into a coma. Id.
Mitchell presents facts that have more in common with Brandenburg than with
Chaplinsky. See supra note 89 (observing that the Brandenburg doctrine of "imminent
lawless action" is essentially analogous to the fighting words doctrine, except that it
applies to an audience of sympathetic listeners). Mitchell may not have been speak-
ing fighting words, but his remarks, directed as they were to a sympathetic audience
and in an effort to incite imminent lawlessness, were tantamount to harmful conduct,
and not speech. See infra text accompanying note 217.
215. 113 S. Ct. at 2197. The Wisconsin penalty enhancement statute provides for an
increased penalty for an offense whenever the defendant " '[i]ntentionally selects the
person against whom the crime . . . is committed or selects the property which is
damaged or otherwise affected by the crime.., because of race, religion, color, disa-
bility, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry of that person.'" Id. at 2197 n.1
(quoting Wis. Stat. § 939.645(1)(b)(1989-90)). The statute was amended in 1992, but
the amendments were not at issue in the Mitchell case.
216. Mitchell 1, 485 N.W.2d at 811. The court concluded that the statute punished
"the 'because of' aspect of the defendant's selection, the reason the defendant se-
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On appeal, the United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed
the state court, holding that the penalty enhancement was constitu-
tional because it punished the "conduct" of intentionally selecting the
victim.2"7 Because the statute restricted "conduct" and not "speech,"
it was subject to a lower level of scrutiny than the strict scrutiny ap-
plied in First Amendment analysis.21s The Court agreed with the gov-
ernment that its interest in redressing the "greater individual and
societal harm" inflicted by bias-inspired crimes was rationally related
to the penalty enhancement provision, and thus sufficient to justify the
regulation. 1 The Court was untroubled by the fact that the statute
might suffer from some form of "underbreadth." 0 It also rejected
lected the victim," id. at 812, and therefore, impermissibly punished the defendant for
his beliefs.
217. Mitchell II, 113 S. Ct. at 2201. The defendant argued that the penalty enhance-
ment statute impermissibly punished a defendant's discriminatory motive. Id. at 2200.
The Court conceded that the only reason for the enhanced penalty was the defend-
ant's discriminatory motive for selecting the victim, but reasoned that motive is in-
deed a relevant factor in sentencing. Id. at 2199-2200. It stated that "motive plays the
same role under the Wisconsin statute as it does under federal and state antidis-
crimination laws, which we have previously upheld against constitutional challenge."
Id at 2200 (citations omitted).
For further consideration of the punishment of motive in penalty enhancement stat-
utes, compare Susan Gellman, Sticks and Stones Can Put You in Jail, but Can Words
Increase Your Sentence? Constitutional and Policy Dilemmas of Ethnic Intimidation
Laws, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 333, 364-65 (1991) [hereinafter Sticks and Stones] (distin-
guishing motive from intent and arguing that penalty enhancement statutes unconsti-
tutionally punish motive) and Susan Gellman, Hate Crime Laws are Thought Crime
Laws, 1992/1993 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 509, 509-10 (criticizing Wisconsin v. Mitchell and
asserting that penalty enhancement statutes, even if decidedly constitutional, are "all
sizzle and no steak") with Eric G. Grannis, Note, Fighting Words and Fighting Free-
style: The Constitutionality of Penalty Enhancement For Bias Crimes, 93 Colum. L
Rev. 178, 188-91 (1993) (arguing that Gellman's distinction between motive and in-
tent is fallacious) and Note, Hate is Not SpeecL A Constitutional Defense of Penalty
Enhancement For Hate Crimes, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 1314, 1319-23 (1993) (criticizing
Gellman's thesis that penalty enhancement statutes punish bigoted thought and not-
ing that the distinction between motive and intent is "a specious one").
218. Mitchell 11, 113 S. Ct at 2201 ("[T]he statute in this case is aimed at conduct
unprotected by the First Amendment.").
219. Id It is interesting to compare Wisconsin's interest in enhancing the penalty
for certain kinds of bias-motivated crimes with St. Paul's interest in preventing harm
associated with certain types of fighting words. See supra text accompanying note 190.
In Mitchell, the Court deferred to the state's interest. In &A. V., the state advanced
the same interest to justify its Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance. The Court deemed it
compelling, but immaterial, to its analysis. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2550. Thus, the only
difference between the states' interests in Mitchell and R.A. V. seems to have been the
level of scrutiny to which those interests were subjected by the Court.
220. In R.A.V., Justice White had argued that the Court's rule against content-
based restrictions could protect speech that traditionally has fallen outside the scope
of First Amendment protection. Under the Court's new analysis, a statute that pro-
hibited only a subset of fighting words would be considered unconstitutionally "un-
derbroad" because its purpose could have been accomplished by banning a wider
category of speech. Id. at 2553-54 (White, J., concurring).
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the defendant's argument that the statute was overbroad because of
its potential "chilling effect" on free speech.2 2'
According to the Court, its decision in R.A.V. was easily
distinguishable:
That case involved a First Amendment challenge to a municipal or-
dinance . . . [which] only proscribed a class of 'fighting words'
deemed particularly offensive by the city .... [W]e held that it vio-
lated the rule against content-based discrimination. But whereas
th[at] ordinance . . . was explicitly directed at expression (i.e.,
'speech' or 'messages'[)], the statute in this case is aimed at conduct
222
This distinction is seemingly arbitrary, however, because the R.A. V.
statute also could have been interpreted to outlaw the "conduct" of
cross burning.
C. Two Distinct Cases
R.A.V. and Mitchell are in fact distinguishable, but insufficiently so
in order to justify such incongruous and seemingly contrary results.
The R.A.V. Court analyzed a difficult hate crime statute and con-
cluded that it violated the First Amendment. Mitchell, in contrast,
treated a penalty enhancement statute as a prohibition of certain con-
duct that only minimally implicated speech rights.
When the facts in R.A.V.-a cross burning by a white man on the
lawn of a black family-are placed alongside the facts in Mitchell-
the assault of a white victim by a group of black teenagers-the in-
compatibility of the Court's analysis becomes evident. Assaulting a
boy because he is white is as much expression as intimidating an Afri-
can-American family by burning a cross on their lawn. Similarly,
burning a cross to intimidate an African-American family is as much
conduct as assaulting a white boy.
The primary issue in Mitchell was not the physical assault. In all
probability, there would have been no physical contact between
Mitchell and the victim if the boy had been non-white. The purpose
of Mitchell's activity was not to commit an assault, but to express his
221. Mitchell I, 113 S. Ct. at 2201. The defendant argued that the statute chilled
the free expression of those who would be concerned that their prior speech could be
used as evidence of bias motivation in a subsequent crime covered by the statute. The
Court responded that this "sort of chill" is too "attenuated and unlikely" to support a
claim of overbreadth. But see Grimm v. Churchill, 932 F.2d 674, 675-76 (7th Cir.
1991) (using information from a police officer's relative regarding a defendant's his-
tory of making racial slurs to determine if the police officer had probable cause to
arrest the defendant on charges of ethnic intimidation); see also Gellman, Sticks and
Stones, supra note 217, at 360-61 (asserting that the Mitchell Court underestimated
the chilling effect of its decision).
222. Mitchell II, 113 S. Ct. at 2200-01 (citations omitted); see R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at
2546 (distinguishing the St. Paul ordinance from laws, such as the Mitchell penalty
enhancement statute, that are "directed not against speech but against conduct").
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anger about the treatment of African-Americans by white men, as de-
picted in a movie. His chosen means to communicate that expression
was the assault of a white person. Mitchell's assault of a white boy
was thus "an undifferentiated whole, 100% action and 100% expres-
sion. It involve[d] no conduct that is not at the same time communica-
tion, and no communication that does not result from conduct."'
The same may be said of Robert Viktora's activity of burning a cross
on the lawn of an African-American family.2 4
R.A.V. and Mitchell are technically distinguishable. The challenged
statutes are different; one is a First Amendment case, while the other
is a criminal conduct case. Conceptually, however, they are indistin-
guishable because they both raise speech and conduct issues. The
facts of the cases are roughly analogous; each presents circumstances
of bias-motivated hatred based on race. Also, the state interests in
each case could have been considered sufficiently compelling to justify
the constitutionality of each statute. How then did the Court reach
different results in the two cases?
At first glance, the Court's analysis in each case seems overly influ-
enced by the particular statute of the case. Surely it is the Court's job
to decide whether the statute presented before it is constitutional.
But the history of fighting words jurisprudence is filled with examples
in which the Court manipulated the statutory analysis in order to ar-
rive at a more favorable outcome-often choosing to apply one of a
variety of possible rationales to justify a particular result.' Again,
the Court's decisions appear to have been arbitrary and unprincipled.
This Note suggests that although the decisions appear to be irrecon-
cilable, in fact, the Court was guided in each case by the same prevail-
ing principle underlying the fighting words doctrine. In Chaplinsky
and its progeny, including most recently, R.A.V. and Mitchell, the
Court has stepped in whenever it determined that, in a given set of
circumstances, potentially violent consequences were likely to arise
from the expression of aggressively charged communications. The
conduct implications of fighting words provide a framework through
which to understand what might otherwise be viewed as an inconsis-
tent jurisprudence.
This Note asserts that in fighting words and other speech-related
cases, the Court has always focused on the harmful consequences and
the potential for retaliatory conduct that may arise from provocative
words uttered in certain circumstances. Even when the Court appears
to be restricting speech, it is merely prohibiting harmful conduct that
223. John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482, 1495 (1975). Ely
made the statement in reference to the draft card burning in United States v. O'Brien.
Id.
224. See Lawrence, supra note 21, at 694.
225. See supra part I.C.
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takes on the character of speech by depending on language for its
existence. Thus, the apparently shocking pronouncement of Justice
Scalia in R.A.V., that even fighting words may engender some protec-
tion under the First Amendment, 226 comes as no surprise.2 27 In fact,
even in its initial pronouncement of the fighting words doctrine in
Chaplinsky, the Court's real interest was in preventing breaches of the
peace, not in restricting speech.228
III. THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN SPEECH AND CONDUCT
This part explores the Court's formal articulation of the distinction
between speech and conduct in United States v. O'Brien. It then uses
the framework provided in O'Brien as a basis for understanding the
conceptual differences between speech and conduct and the Court's
treatment of the two in the context of fighting words. This Note as-
serts that this speech/conduct distinction is the key to reconciling the
apparent inconsistencies in fighting words jurisprudence and applying
the fighting words doctrine effectively.
A. The Formal Distinction Between Speech and Conduct
The distinction between speech and conduct was formally articu-
lated in United States v. O'Brien.229 The defendant in that case, David
Paul O'Brien, intentionally burned his draft card before a public
crowd on the steps of the South Boston Courthouse.230 When hostile
crowd members turned violent, an FBI agent lead O'Brien away from
the crowd and then arrested him."' He was convicted for intention-
ally violating the regulation of the Universal Military 'Training and
Service Act that required possession of one's draft card at all times. 232
O'Brien challenged his conviction on the ground that the 1965
226. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2543-44.
227. See, e.g., id. at 2567 (Stevens, J., concurring) (acknowledging that the "categor-
ical approach is unworkable and the quest for absolute categories of 'protected' and
'unprotected' speech [is] ultimately futile").
228. See supra note 49.
229. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
230. Id. at 369. The FBI agents who arrested O'Brien claimed that, at the time of
the arrest, they knew only that O'Brien and his companions had burned small white
cards. Only later did they learn that the card O'Brien burned was actually his regis-
tration certificate. Id. at 369 n.1. At trial, O'Brien stated that he had burned the
registration certificate in order to protest the Vietnam war and to influence others to
adopt his antiwar beliefs. Id. at 370.
231. Id. at 369.
232. Although O'Brien was charged under the original language of 50 U.S.C.
§ 462(b) of the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, Congress had
amended § 462(b)(3) in 1965 to make it an offense for anyone "'who forges, alters,
knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certifi-
cate.'" Id. at 370 (original statute amended by italicized words) (quoting 50 U.S.C.
§ 462(b)(6), 79 Stat. 586 (1965)).
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Amendment to the Act, under which he was convicted, was unconsti-
tutionally enacted to abridge First Amendment rights.233
The Supreme Court held that the government's interest in tracking
the distribution and possession of draft cards was sufficient to sustain
O'Brien's conviction, '  despite the fact that O'Brien's arrest was
probably unrelated to record keeping. In retrospect, the stated gov-
ernmental purpose of the legislation may appear suspect. But even in
1968, the Court would not have invalidated the statute on the basis of
improper legislative motive,3 5 so long as the regulation furthered a
substantial government interest. 3 6
233. O'Brien argued that conduct punishable under the 1965 Amendment was al-
ready punishable under a "nonpossession regulation" that required registrants to
keep their registration certificates in their "'personal possession at all times.'"
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 371 (quoting 32 C.F.R. § 1617.1 (1962)). If Congress' purpose
was to ensure accurate record keeping, then the nonpossession regulation should have
been a sufficient measure under which to prosecute the defendant and others who lost
or intentionally destroyed their certificates.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit agreed and concluded that the 1965
Amendment was unconstitutional. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 541 (1st
Cir. 1967). Since the government already could punish the nonpossession of a regis-
tration certificate, the court concluded that the 1965 Amendment must have been
intended to apply to the public destruction of cards, and therefore, to punish persons
engaged in political protests. Id.
234. The Supreme Court distinguished the government interests served by the non-
possession regulation and the 1965 Amendment:
The gravamen of the offense defined by the [1965 Amendment] is the delib-
erate rendering of certificates unavailable for the various purposes which
they may serve. Whether registrants keep their certificates in their personal
possession at all times, as required by the [nonpossession] regulations, is of
no particular concern under the 1965 Amendment, as long as they do not
mutilate or destroy the certificates so as to render them unavailable.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 380-81.
The 1965 Amendment required proof of the defendant's intent; the Court should
have required the government to prove that O'Brien's intent was to frustrate its rec-
ord keeping system. However, whether O'Brien lost or burned his draft card should
have been irrelevant if the government's interest in the regulation was the accuracy of
its records. More likely, the amendment was reflective of Congress' desire to stop the
protest burnings of draft cards.
235. In an appendix to its opinion, the Court cited to portions of the legislative
history of the 1965 Amendment, which suggested that the legislature may have in-
tended to restrict speech rights. It stated: "'The House Committee on Armed Serv-
ices is fully aware of, and shares in, the deep concern ...over the increasing
incidences in which individuals ... openly defy and encourage others to defy the
authority of their Government by destroying or mutilating their draft cards.'" Id. at
387 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 747, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965)).
236. The Court also cited to the Senate Committee report, which advanced a sub-
stantial government interest in stopping the mutilation of draft cards. It stated:
"'The Committee has taken notice of the defiant destruction and mutilation of draft
cards by dissident persons who disapprove of national policy. If allowed to continue
unchecked this contumacious conduct represents a potential threat to the exercise of
the power to raise and support armies.'" lI. (quoting S. Rep. No. 589, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1965)). But see id. at 383 (indicating that inquiry into legislative intent is a tricky
and unreliable business); see also Tribe, supra note 74, § 12-6, at 823 (asserting that
judicial inquiry into legislative motives would be futile if courts were asked to discern
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The Court construed the statute as a regulation on the conduct of
draft card burning, and not as a restriction on the expression of anti-
war sentiment. It therefore avoided having to apply a strict scrutiny
analysis 37 Rather, the Court applied an intermediate level of scru-
tiny, which required that the government identify only a substantial,
not a compelling, interest that was unrelated to the suppression of
speech.238 According to the O'Brien Court, "when 'speech' and 'non-
speech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a suffi-
ciently important government interest in regulating the nonspeech
element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment free-
doms. ' '2 39 Thus, the fact that O'Brien's activity also was a form of
expressive communication was irrelevant to the determination that his
conduct had other consequences that the regulation was aimed at
preventing.
The O'Brien Court articulated a four-prong test to determine
whether the government regulation was sufficiently important to jus-
tify the limitation on free speech.240 The elements of the test are as
follows: (1) the conduct is such that it may be constitutionally regu-
lated; (2) the regulation furthers a substantial government interest; (3)
the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of free speech;
and (4) the limitations on speech are no greater than what are essen-
tial to further the asserted government interest.241 To some degree,
the O'Brien test requires that courts, at the outset of their inquiries,
make arbitrary distinctions between the elements of speech and con-
duct in order to determine the predominant element being restricted
by a given regulation. If the speech element predominates in a regula-
tion, courts may not apply the O'Brien standard, but will instead sub-
ject the law to a strict scrutiny analysis.242 On the other hand, if the
an impermissible "sole" or "dominant" purpose behind legislation, because the inten-
tions of legislators will always be "multiple and mixed").
237. See supra note 200.
238. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
239. Id. at 376. Even the O'Brien standard would have been unconstitutional
under the R.A.V. rule prohibiting content-based restrictions on speech. Thus, the
Court in R.A.V. added the O'Brien standard as another exception to the general rule.
See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
240. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The four-prong O'Brien test has become the stan-
dard application for "complex" cases in which activity includes both "speech" and
"nonspeech" or "conduct" elements.
The O'Brien test theoretically applies only to statutes that look to regulate conduct.
This Note asserts, however, that the O'Brien standard also may be applied to statutes
that appear to regulate only speech. Some speech regulations can be understood as
laws intended to prevent the harmful conduct that is likely to result from such speech,
and not as laws intended to restrict the content of the speech itself. See infra part
III.B.
241. 391 U.S. at 377. The O'Brien Court found that the 1965 Amendment met the
four requirements, and consequently, that O'Brien's conviction was constitutional. Id.
242. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 403 (1989) (stating that if a case falls
outside the O'Brien test, the Court must use a higher level of scrutiny to determine if
the state's interest justifies the regulation).
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regulation is focused on preventing certain conduct, courts may apply
the more deferential O'Brien test, even if some expression will neces-
sarily be restricted as a result of enforcing the regulation.
The flexibility of the O'Brien framework is most apparent in the
case of non-obscene adult forms of entertainment, such as bars offer-
ing nude dancing2 43 and theaters offering adult films.2' For example,
applying the O'Brien test, a sharply divided Court in Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc.2 45 upheld a public decency statute246 challenged by a bar
and an adult entertainment center that wanted to offer live nude danc-
ing.247 Regarding the Court's consideration of the second prong of
the O'Brien test, the majority as much as conceded that it could not
pinpoint exactly what substantial interest the legislators sought to fur-
ther.' 4 But it was satisfied that the statute's purpose was to protect
"societal order and morality., 249 Because the statute furthered a le-
gitimate government interest, the Court accepted at face value that
243. See Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
244. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v.
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
245. 501 U.S. 560 (1991). Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the majority, which
included only Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, and himself. Justices Scalia and Sou-
ter filed separate opinions concurring in the judgment. Justice White, joined by Jus-
tices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens, filed the dissent. Id. at 562.
246. The statute provided in relevant part that "'a person who knowingly or inten-
tionally, in a public place... appears in a state of nudity ... commits public inde-
cency'" and is guilty of a misdemeanor. Id at 569 n.2 (quoting Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1
(1988)). The statute defined nudity as the showing of private parts with anything
"'less than a fully opaque covering.' " Id. (quoting Ind. Code § 35-45-4-1(b) (1988)).
Arguably, much of current fashion would violate the Indiana ordinance.
247. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 562-63. The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit had
concluded that nude dancing for entertainment purposes is protected expression and
that "the public indecency statute was an improper infringement of that expressive
activity because its purpose was to prevent the message of eroticism and sexuality
conveyed by the dancers." Id at 565 (referring to Miller v. Civil City of South Bend,
904 F.2d 1081 (1990)). The Supreme Court agreed that nude dancing is a form of
expressive activity, but proceeded to apply the four-prong O'Brien standard to re-
verse the lower court and uphold the statute as a permissible regulation of conduct.
Id. at 566-67; see also California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109, 118 (1972) (applying O'Brien
test, but finding nude dancing to be expressive activity).
248. Barnes, 501 U.S. at 567-68.
249. Id. at 568. The Court reasoned that a state's traditional police power includes
the power to provide for the "morals" of society. Id. at 569. The Court relied on the
infamous case, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), for the proposition that
legislators may legislate notions of morality. Ia However, it is virtually impossible to
measure a government's interest in the enforcement of morality. See Vincent Blasi,
Six Conservatives in Search of the First Amendment The Revealing Case of Nude
Dancing, 33 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 611, 640 (1992). It is equally difficult to define
claims of moral harm in any meaningful standardized manner. See id. Because it is
conceptually limitless, the morality justification potentially could be used to justify a
wide range of restrictions on speech. See Joel M. Gora, On The Brink: The First
Amendment in the Rehnquist Cour4 1990-91 Term, 9 Touro L Rev. 120, 140 (1992)
(suggesting that free speech cases such as Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205
(1975) and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) would have come out differently
under the lax standard in Barnes).
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the restriction was intended only to prevent public nudity, and not to
suppress any message conveyed by the dancers-5 0 While reasonable
persons, including four of the Justices, 25 ' disagreed as to the correct-
ness of the Court's holding,z25 it is at least derived from a principled
inquiry, albeit one that permits great flexibility.
The broad range of applications of the O'Brien test is also apparent
in two cases in which the Court upheld zoning ordinances that re-
stricted the location of adult film theaters." 3 Both cases applied the
O'Brien standard, combined with a secondary effects argument," 4 to
conclude that a restriction on First Amendment rights was permissible
to further the government's interest in preserving the "character of its
neighborhoods ' ' 5 and the "quality of urban life." 6
In City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,2 57 the Court concluded
that since the government's predominant "concerns were with the sec-
ondary effects of adult theaters,"" 8 the ordinance was properly ana-
250. It stated only that "[tlhe requirement that the dancers don pasties and a G-
string does not deprive the dance of whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply
makes the message slightly less graphic." Barnes, 501 U.S. at 571.
251. See supra note 245.
252. Professor Blasi suggested that if the state's interest was indeed to prevent pub-
lic nudity, perhaps it should have sent out a state employee to affix fig leaves to nude
paintings in public museums. See Blasi, supra note 249, at 642. Professor Blasi added
that the Court could have more clearly distinguished nude go-go dancing from the
fine arts. The Court's failure to separate these high and low level forms of artistic
expression suggests the possibility that the nudity prohibition could be applied to
other forms of expression. Id. at 643.
253. See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 43 (1986) (uphold-
ing a regulation that restricted the location of an adult theater "within 1000 feet of
any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park or school");
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 52 (1976) (upholding a zoning
ordinance that differentiated between motion picture theaters and adult theaters and
dictated that adult theaters "may not be located within 1,000 feet of any two other
'regulated uses' or within 500 feet of a residential area").
254. The secondary effects argument is a variation of the O'Brien standard. It en-
ables the Court to consider the effects of conduct and to regulate that conduct, be-
cause of its harmful secondary effects. For example, in Renton, the Court determined
that the interest in preventing the adverse effects of adult theaters, including "neigh-
borhood blight," was sufficient to justify a restrictive zoning ordinance despite the fact
that the opening of an adult theater was lawful in itself. Renton, 475 U.S. at 51-52.
Note that the secondary effects test is the second exception to the R.A.V. rule
against content-based restrictions. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
255. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71. The government determined that "a
concentration of the 'adult' theaters causes the area to deteriorate and become a fo-
cus of crime." Id. at 71 n.34.
256. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48. The government claimed that the ordinance was
"designed to prevent crime, protect the city's retail trade, maintain property values,
and generally 'protec[t] and preserv[e] the quality of [the city's] neighborhoods, com-
mercial districts, and the quality of urban life,' not to suppress the expression of un-
popular ideas." Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
257. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
258. Id. at 47.
[Vol. 63
FIGHTING WORDS
lyzed as a "time, place and manner"'' 9 restriction on conduct and was
"unrelated to the suppression of free expression."'  In Renton, as in
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., the Court treated the govern-
ment's interest in the quality of urban life as worthy of "high re-
spect."26' It did not explain the basis for finding the interest to be a
"substantial" one.262
As the adult entertainment cases show, the O'Brien standard is suf-
ficiently flexible to accommodate all sorts of restrictions on speech
when the government advances a neutral interest. The primary inquiry
driving the Court's analysis in O'Brien was not whether conduct out-
weighed speech or speech outweighed conduct in the particular
case.26 3 Rather, the Court examined whether the harmful conse-
quences of the activity necessitated that the activity be proscribed. It
determined that the conduct of draft card burning was sufficiently
harmful to the government's ability to maintain an efficient draft re-
gistration so as to make the activity punishable. There was, therefore,
no need to balance the individual's right to speech with the govern-
ment's right to regulate conduct.
Similarly, with regard to other regulations, if courts can identify
some aspect of conduct that is the target of a law, then they can apply
259. See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (defining the time,
place and manner test for evaluating restrictions on expression in public forums). The
Renton Court applied this public forum test to private property. Renton, 475 U.S. at
48; see also Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 288-89
(1984) (stating that the time, place and manner test is interpreted as similar to the
O'Brien test).
260. Renton, 475 U.S. at 48. But see Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 316 (1988) (Bren-
nan, J., concurring) (stating that the "ill-defined nature of the Renton analysis cer-
tainly exacerbates the risk that many laws designed to suppress disfavored speech will
go undetected" under the guise of conduct with secondary effects).
261. Renton, 475 U.S. at 50 (citing American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71).
262. The government offered no proof that the presence of adult film theaters in a
community had or would have harmful secondary effects. Rather, the Court accepted
the government's reliance on the experiences of other non-comparable cities to sup-
port its claim that adult theaters have harmful effects on the surrounding community.
Id. at 51; American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
If the interest in improving city life and preventing possible increases in crime was
sufficiently "substantial" to support the content-based zoning restriction on adult the-
aters, the interest in racial harmony in a community fraught with racial violence
should have been a sufficiently substantial interest to support restrictions on race
based fighting words. See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,259-61 (1952) (relying
upon historical evidence of racial violence to uphold a content-based restriction on
speech). But see R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992) (striking selective
fighting words ordinance designed to prevent bias-motivated hate crimes, despite the
clear presence of a compelling interest in protecting citizens from the unique harms
associated with hate crimes).
263. Professor Thomas Emerson argued that the distinction between speech and
conduct, though not absolute, could be a useful tool to determine which elements
predominate in any given circumstance. Thomas I. Emerson, The System Of Free-
dom Of Expression 14-20 (1970). Though Emerson's analysis may yield interesting
debate, it is not the investigation that the Court undertook to arrive at its conclusion.
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the O'Brien standard to nudity restrictions, zoning ordinances and a
variety of other types of regulations. The cases demonstrate that, de-
spite the high value we place on the First Amendment, it is and has
always been vulnerable to compromise, whether to facilitate military
record keeping, to prevent violence or even to enforce a certain stan-
dard of morality.
The wide range of discretion afforded courts under the O'Brien
standard presupposes that in some instances, the standard may be im-
properly applied. Nevertheless, the rationale underlying the speech/
conduct distinction is a sensible one, for it enables the Court to make
principled, albeit subjective, judgments about the constitutionality of
regulations that restrict certain types of activity.2" To the extent that
a court can identify the existence of harmful conduct that the govern-
ment has an important interest in regulating, the activity can be re-
stricted even if it also possesses expressive elements. The distinction
prevents " 'an apparently limitless variety of conduct [from being] la-
beled "speech" whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends
thereby to express an idea.' "265 The Court made clear in O'Brien, as
in Chaplinsky, that there are instances when the expression of an idea,
regardless of its content, may be constitutionally restricted in order to
prevent the greater harm that would otherwise likely result.
B. The Practical Distinction Between Speech and Conduct
The right to free speech is valuable in so far as it enables the
speaker to participate in a dialogue.266 Outside the context of a dia-
264. This is not to suggest that the Court will always find the "right" decision. Ar-
guably, even O'Brien was wrongly decided. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 394 U.S. 444,
455 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that the Court's affirmance of O'Brien's convic-
tion was "not ... consistent with the First Amendment"); see also Emerson, supra
note 263, at 83-87 (disagreeing with the O'Brien holding and arguing that in that case,
the expressive element in burning a draft card clearly predominated over the conduct
element); Ely, supra note 223, at 1494-95 (same).
There will always be an element of subjectivity in determining the permissibility of
state regulations that restrict speech. See Stevens, supra note 185, at 1299-1300 (ex-
plaining that the First Amendment, when applied to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment, guarantees only that states may not restrict speech rights without due
process, and that, "when the permissibility of a deprivation depends [in part] on the
presence or absence of 'due process' . . . an element of judgment is necessarily in-
jected into the constitutional calculus"). The O'Brien standard at least provides a
framework to limit that subjectivity. Cf. Tribe, supra note 74, § 12-7, at 827 (arguing
that the conduct/speech distinction "must be seen at best as announcing a conclusion
of the Court, rather than as summarizing in any way the analytic processes which led
the Court to that conclusion").
265. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194, 2199 (1993) (quoting United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)). But nor should an apparently limitless variety of
"speech" be labeled conduct whenever the government needs a neutral reason to re-
strict the activity. See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 567-68 (1991)
(applying the four-prong O'Brien test to uphold a regulation restricting public nudity
on the basis of a state's interest in societal order and morality).
266. See Tribe, supra note 74, § 12-8, at 837.
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logue, a speaker's right to speech becomes only an empty right to talk.
It is, therefore, most helpful to distinguish between "contexts in which
talk leaves room for reply and those in which talk triggers action or
causes harm without the time or opportunity for response." 7 The
distinction between speech and conduct in O'Brien provides a useful
framework in which to determine when words fall within the former
context of dialogue, and when, as in the latter context, they constitute
fighting words.
The Court's inquiry in O'Brien was limited to the conduct element
of the defendant's communications, because the focus of the statute
was on the regulation of conduct.2 1 The same inquiry may be under-
taken with respect to communications that take the form of speech.269
When a person's speech, directed to another person or group of per-
sons, is of a quality that is likely to engender violent conduct, that
communication, though verbal, is not speech as a part of a dialogue.z2 °
Such speech is more akin in nature to conduct, because it is more
likely to provoke conduct, than dialogue. Therefore, it may be re-
stricted as fighting words without regard to the message being com-
municated. When the conduct implications of fighting words are so
understood, it becomes clear that the Court, in applying the fighting
words doctrine, has been using the speech/conduct distinction ever
since it first articulated the doctrine in Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire.7'
Of the eleven cases reviewed in part I, three dealt with circum-
stances in which a defendant's activity clearly included elements of
both speech and conduct.' z In United States v. O'Brien, where the
Court established the O'Brien test, it affirmed the conviction because
the statute in that case focused on preventing only conduct.2 3 In the
two flag burning cases, the Court determined that the Texas and New
York statutes challenged in those cases were intended to restrict the
speech element of the expressive activity, despite the fact that the act
267. Id
268. See supra note 232.
269. This assertion does not suggest that speech is analogous to conduct and neces-
sarily may be restricted whenever a government determines that the speech has harm-
ful consequences. In fact, the Court has applied a greater level of scrutiny to
regulations of speech than it has to regulations of conduct. See Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 406 (1989) (stating that governments may regulate expressive conduct more
freely than they may regulate the written or spoken word). Rather, the point is that
courts have discretion in their initial determination of whether a regulation is primar-
ily one of conduct or speech. In making this determination, courts may choose to
identify some aspect of regulating conduct embedded in the law, even if it appears to
regulate only speech.
270. See supra note 8 and accompanying text; see also pp. 829-30.
271. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
272. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576
(1969); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
273. But see sources cited supra note 264 (arguing that O'Brien was wrongly
decided).
19941
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
of flag burning clearly contemplates a conduct component. 274 There-
fore, the Court applied a strict scrutiny analysis and not the more def-
erential O'Brien test. Because the government interest was not
compelling, the Court struck down the statutes as impermissible in-
fringements on speech.275
In several of the cases in which defendants engaged only in speech
activity, the Court overturned convictions despite the fact that the
statutes had been limited by state court constructions to prohibit only
fighting words.2 76 These cases do not prove, however, that the fight-
ing words doctrine is ineffectual or futile.2 77 Rather, they are a testa-
ment to the fact that fighting words cannot be understood as a precise
category of proscribable speech. "Fighting words" are not defined by
a particular list of words that, when spoken, are unprotected by the
First Amendment. The use of language, the nuances and subtleties of
words, the context in which words are used to elicit compassion or to
invoke retaliatory anger, are very complex and often inscrutable. A
simple construction of a statute to prohibit only fighting words neces-
sarily cannot assist the Court in interpreting the statute and determin-
ing whether it infringes on free speech.278 State court constructions
also do not prevent the Court from overturning convictions when the
circumstances necessitate that they be overturned.
For example, though the trial and appellate courts in Terminiello v.
Chicago understood the statute in that case to apply only to fighting
words, the Court determined that the statute was overbroad.279 In
that case, the defendant's political speech had been scheduled in ad-
274. The Court did not apply the O'Brien test per se in Street v. New York. But the
statute in that case, like the statute in Texas v. Johnson, fell outside the O'Brien stan-
dard because it prohibited contempt for the flag by speech or conduct. See supra note
81. The Court determined that the statute could have been aimed at punishing those
who expressed disdain for the flag on account of their political views. Therefore, it
could not be said that the regulation was unrelated to the suppression of free speech,
as required by the third prong of the test. See supra notes 240-41 and accompanying
text.
Regarding the statute in Texas v. Johnson, see supra notes 118-21 and accompany-
ing text.
275. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 422; Street, 394 U.S. at 594.
276. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (striking down the stat-
ute because it was overbroad, despite having been given a fighting words
construction).
277. But see sources cited infra note 305.
278. Whenever a lower court would construe a statute as limited to fighting words,
it would declare that only expressions falling within the narrow category of fighting
words could be punished. This Note argues that the doctrine of fighting words is
based on preventing retaliatory conduct and not on restricting speech-let alone a
definable category of speech. Thus, whenever a lower court applied a narrowing
fighting words construction to a statute, that statute was doomed to be struck down by
the Court on appeal. Instead of assisting a reviewing court, a fighting words construc-
tion ultimately limited a court's ability to interpret the statute as a regulation on
conduct.
279. For a discussion of Terminiello, see supra notes 51-60 and accompanying text.
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vance, and a team of police officers had been assigned to parole what
the police expected would be an unruly crowd.'8 To affirm such a
conviction would have set a dangerous precedent for limiting the First
Amendment's protection of political speech. Therefore, the circum-
stances necessitated that the Court overturn the conviction.
In Gooding v. Wilson and Lewis v. City of New Orleans, the Court
again used the overbreadth doctrine as a simple means to overturn the
convictions.28 The Court was compelled to overturn the convictions
because of one distinguishing factor-the addressee in each case was
a police officer. In general, the Court is willing to accept the notion
that speech that provokes violence may be proscribed. But to uphold
such proscriptions when the speech is directed at police officers would
have put extraordinary discretion at the hands of the police who are
often the only witnesses to a defendant's use of so-called fighting
words. Moreover, it would have implied that police officers, when
challenged by fighting words, may be provoked to violence as easily as
might the "average addressee."'  In other words, the Court resolved
that police officers have a special obligation, over and above that of
the average person, not to be vulnerable to verbal provocation. 83
In contrast, in Cohen v. California,' the conduct of walking
through a courthouse was lawful in itself. Since the activity was
clearly intended to convey a political message, and it did not raise the
possibility of imminent violence, there was no reason to uphold the
disorderly conduct conviction. There was simply no disorderly con-
duct to punish;" 5 any conviction would have been improperly based
on the content of the defendant's message.
The same may be said of the circumstances in Brandenburg v.
Ohio.286 The statute at issue in that case was a criminal syndicalism
act, and the fact pattern did not fit the typical fighting words scena-
rio.28 Nevertheless, the Court focused on the conduct implications of
fighting words. Had Brandenburg's speech been of a quality that
280. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
281. For a discussion of Gooding and Lewis, see supra notes 101-13, 137-38 and
accompanying text.
282. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942).
283. Fighting words, by definition, should never be proscribable when directed at
police officers, because there should be no likelihood of retaliatory conduct. See, e.g.,
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972) (declining to affirm the conviction on the
grounds that the statute was limited to fighting words, even though the defendant's
speech clearly threatened violence to the police officer addressee); see also Lewis v.
City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (following Gooding to strike down a fight-
ing words statute that was limited to speech directed to on-duty police officers).
284. For a discussion of Cohen, see supra notes 91-100, 127-33 and accompanying
text.
285. See supra text accompanying note 129.
286. For a discussion of Brandenburg, see supra notes 85-87 and accompanying
text.
287. See supra note 89.
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could have "incited imminent lawless action," the Court would have
upheld his conviction. But the Court determined that there was no
possibility of violent conduct in response to Brandenburg's
speech'- 8-whether it be inspired by his speech, or in retaliation. De-
spite its hateful message, Brandenburg's speech was not likely to lead
to harmful conduct.
Feiner v. New York 89 is analogous to the other cases involving dis-
orderly conduct statutes, except in Feiner, the Court upheld the con-
viction. The facts of the case conformed to both the "fighting words"
and "imminent lawless action" paradigms because the defendant had
addressed a crowd of both critics and supporters of his ideas.290 The
Court ultimately upheld the conviction by focusing on the conduct im-
plications of fighting words. The circumstances in the case warranted
this result, because in Feiner, unlike in Brandenburg, the Court found
that violence was imminent.291
Only one of the statutes challenged in the cases reviewed in part I
was clearly "content-based," as the Court defined the term in
R.A.V. 292 Nevertheless, the Court upheld that law in Beauharnais v.
Illinois.293 Since it was debatable whether Beauharnais was still good
law prior to R.A.V.,2 94 and it is clear that R.A.V practically overruled
288. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445-46 (1969) (noting that "no one was
present other than the participants and the newsmen who made the film" and "[m]ost
of the words uttered during the scene were incomprehensible when the film was
projected").
289. For a discussion of Feiner, see supra notes 61-67 and accompanying text.
290. The majority stated that there was a possibility that the defendant would incite
his supporters to react violently towards critics in the crowd. Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315, 317 (1951).
291. Id. at 319-20. According to Justice Black's dissent, however, the facts did not
indicate that violence was imminent. Id. at 325 (Black, J., dissenting). Thus, he as-
serted, the conviction must have rested on the content of Feiner's speech, and not on
his conduct. Id. at 321-22; see supra note 67.
That the Justices disagreed as to whether a riot was looming does not detract from
the thesis that fighting words is a conduct-related doctrine. The conduct principle of
fighting words, as set out in this Note, is meant only to lend coherence to the Court's
jurisprudence in this area of law. It does not suggest that the Court was correct in
every decision. In the case of Feiner, the Justices' disagreement as to the imminence
of violence actually underscores their focus on whether harmful conduct was likely to
result from the defendant's activity.
292. See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
293. For a discussion of Beauharnais, see supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text.
The state convinced the Court that its fear of violence was reasonable in light of the
history of racial riots in the state. See supra note 73; see also Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d
1197, 1204 (7th Cir.) (protecting a Nazi march through a Jewish neighborhood as ex-
pressive activity and noting that the state failed to show an actual fear of violence),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
294. See supra note 74. The Court has since rejected the state's interest in that case
as insufficient to justify the infringement on free speech. But until R.A.V., no case
had conflicted directly with the holding in Beauharnais, so it had never been formally
overruled. The Court's pronouncement in R.A.V. that content-based restrictions on
speech are presumptively invalid presented such an opportunity to overrule Beauhar-
nais, and yet the Court failed to do so.
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the case, one wonders why the Court did not formally overrule Beau-
harnais on the basis of its new rule against content-based restrictions
on speech.295
This Note asserts that the Court deliberately declined to overrule
Beauharnais. Had it formally overruled Beauharnais in the same
breath as it called St. Paul's interest "compelling," that statement
would have been mere lip service in the name of political correctness.
Instead, the Court signalled that St. Paul's interest in preventing hate
crimes, like Illinois' interest in preventing further racial violence, was
indeed compelling. It indicated that such an interest could be effec-
tively protected through legislation, just not legislation that impermis-
sibly infringed on the First Amendment.296
No decision after Chaplinsky explicitly affirmed a conviction on the
basis of fighting words. However, every decision reviewed in part I
applied a fighting words analysis to affirm or reverse lower court deci-
sions. In each case, the Court considered the conduct implications of
fighting words to determine whether there was any likelihood of vio-
lent conduct arising from a defendant's expressive activity.
Similarly, the Court's decisions in R.A. V. and Mitchell can be recon-
ciled under a conduct-related doctrine of fighting words. In Mitchell,
the state succeeded at prohibiting the types of bias-motivated hatred
that St. Paul was attempting to prohibit. In Mitchell, however, the
state properly regulated the non-speech element of the activity, both
in terms of the underlying crime and the selection of the victim.297
Because St. Paul failed to ferret out the non-speech element of the
activity, its ordinance impermissibly restricted First Amendment
speech rights.298
Much has been written about the scathing debate among the Jus-
tices in the R.A.V. opinions and the import of the Court's holding with
respect to future First Amendment jurisprudence. 219 The real signifi-
cance of the case, however, is not that the Justices disagreed so vehe-
295. If, like fighting words, the category of libel is not entirely outside the scope of
First Amendment protection, then the content-based restriction in the Illinois statute,
see supra note 70, would be presumptively unconstitutional under R.A.V. as well.
296. The problem with the St. Paul ordinance was that it prohibited fighting words
about the disfavored topics of race, color, creed, religion and gender. The Court rec-
ommended that a law prohibiting "fighting words that are directed at certain persons
or groups" would be constitutional provided it could withstand Fourteenth Amend-
ment equal protection challenges. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548 (emphasis added). Such
a law would be permissible precisely because it focuses on the conduct implications of
fighting words, and not on the words themselves.
297. See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text; see also Grannis, supra note
217, at 216-19 (arguing that penalty enhancement statutes are constitutional under the
O'Brien standard).
298. K.A.V., 112 S. Ct at 2550, 2560, 2561.
299. See, e.g., David Goldberger, Hate Crime Laws and Their Impact on the First
Amendment, 1992/93 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 569,570-75 (discussing the Court's split opin-
ions in K.A.V. and their impact on future First Amendment law); Weinberg, supra
note 141, at 301-09 (same).
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mently over the proper means to analyze the St. Paul ordinance.
Rather, the decision is pivotal because a unanimous Court agreed that
the St. Paul ordinance unconstitutionally restricted speech that was
protected under the First Amendment. Despite the heinous circum-
stances of the case, none of the Justices who may have even wanted to
affirm the conviction could find a way to interpret the St. Paul ordi-
nance as a regulation of conduct.
To be sure, the Court's reasoning deviates from traditional First
Amendment analysis.3" Nevertheless, it can be understood as yet an-
other example of how the conduct implications of fighting words, and
not the words themselves or their content, are the focus of the Court's
analysis. It is therefore more significant that the Court rejected the
categorical approach301 than that it replaced it with a rule against con-
tent-based speech restrictions. By rejecting the notion that fighting
words are a discrete category of proscribable speech, the Court can-
didly acknowledged that fighting words have more to do with the con-
duct implications of the challenged words than with the words
themselves.
The Court's decision in Mitchell thus follows from its analysis in
R.A. V. The Mitchell Court unanimously affirmed the conviction pre-
cisely because the Wisconsin statute prohibited conduct, not speech,
and the defendant's conduct violated the statute. Thus, the two cases
are not only reconcilable,3" but they demonstrate the Court's consis-
tency in applying the doctrine of fighting words.30 3
The Court's initial establishment of the fighting words doctrine as a
category of speech falling outside the scope of the First Amendment
virtually ensured that the doctrine would be misunderstood as primar-
ily a proscription on speech. In fact, the fighting words doctrine was
originally intended, and has always been considered, to focus on the
conduct implications of words spoken in hostile circumstances. It is
thus better understood as comparable to its offspring, the conduct-
300. See supra part II.A.2.
301. It is arguable whether, in rejecting the categorical approach with respect to
fighting words, the Court also intended to do away with the other traditional catego-
ries of proscribable speech, as articulated in Chaplinsky. See supra note 7 and accom-
panying text; see also supra note 195 and accompanying text (discussing the R.A. V.
Court's rejection of the categorical approach). Perhaps fighting words, which depend
so much more on the circumstances in which they are spoken than do the other pros-
cribable categories, can be regulated just as well without being confined to categorical
rules.
302. But cf. Constitutional Law Conference, 62 U.S.L.W. 2263, 2272 (Nov. 2, 1993)
(Professor Kathleen Sullivan asserted that Mitchell and R.A.V. are irreconcilable).
303. The difference in the outcomes of the cases has more to do with the City of St.
Paul's misconception of the fighting words doctrine than with the Court's faulty ap-
plication. If St. Paul had understood that the doctrine is designed to prevent the
harmful conduct likely to arise from fighting words, then it could have drafted a law
prohibiting the conduct aspect of speech without infringing impermissibly on the right
to express ideas.
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related doctrine of imminent lawless action,3° than to other proscrib-
able categories of speech.
IV. APPLYING THE CONDUCT PRINCIPLE OF THE FIGHTING WORDS
DOCTRINE
Since neither prong of the Chaplinsky Court's original definition of
fighting words has been used formally to uphold a fighting words con-
viction, many scholars have questioned whether there is anything
more than an empty shell of a doctrine left to preserve.30s Yet, while
the decision in R.A.V. questioned the very existence of fighting words
as a category of proscribable speech, °6 it did not seize that opportu-
nity to overturn the doctrine. The following year's decision in Mitchell
suggested that the principles that compelled the Court in 1942 to es-
tablish the fighting words doctrine are still very much at work in the
Court's First Amendment jurisprudence.
Many states have followed the Court's lead in Mitchell to uphold
penalty-enhancement statutes on the grounds that the statutes pro-
hibit conduct, and not expression protected under the First Amend-
ment.30 7 In most cases, however, the underlying crimes are clearly
related to conduct. Thus, while these statutes serve an important pur-
pose in prohibiting physical offenses committed because of bias moti-
vations, they do not reach the very activity that the fighting words
doctrine was meant to prevent.
The notion that words can constitute acts with legal consequences is
as old as law itself and permeates most areas of modem law. 30s For
304. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
305. See Gard, supra note 89, at 536 (asserting that a case-by-case adjudication has
so eroded fighting words that what remains is "nothing more than a quaint remnant of
an earlier morality"); Shea, supra note 136, at 1-2 (stating that fighting words, no
matter how narrowly defined, are still protected speech); Strossen, supra note 21, at
510 (stating that the Court's narrow construction of Chaplinsky has led commentators
to suggest that it is no longer good law); Demise of Chaplinsky, supra note 138, at
1140, 1145 (arguing that the "inflict injury" prong is essentially overruled and that the
"breach of peace" prong also should be explicitly rejected).
306. See supra part II.A.
307. See, e.g., People v. Aishman, 22 Cal. Rptr. 2d 311 (Cal. App.) (upholding a
statute increasing the punishment for felonies committed on account of one of a list of
specified reasons), petition for review granted, 862 P.2d 663 (Cal. 1993); Stegmaier v.
State, 863 S.W.2d 924 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding a statute increasing the severity
of a crime if committed because of one of several factors); People v. Miccio, 589
N.Y.S.2d 762 (Crim. Ct. 1992) (upholding a statute increasing simple harassment to
aggravated harassment when motivated by bias); State v. Ladue, 631 A.2d 236 (Vt.
1993) (upholding a statute increasing the penalty for a crime when committed on the
basis of one of a list of specified reasons); State v. Talley, 858 P.2d 217 (Wash. 1993)
(en banc) (upholding a penalty enhancement scheme on the grounds that the state
may punish the intentional selection of the victim because of his or her race or other
immutable characteristic).
308. See Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three
Acts, 34 Vand. L. Rev. 265, 270 (1981) (stating that the First Amendment right of free
speech does not include the right to "fix prices, breach contracts, make false warran-
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instance, a promise made orally may bind the promisor in contract.30 9
Under other circumstances, oral statements may constitute fraud.310
Similarly, a false or malicious oral statement about another person
may result in a tort action for slander.31 ' In the criminal sphere,
words between two or more persons about the planning of a criminal
act may constitute conspiracy even if no criminal action follows. 31 2 In
a trial court, words may be verbal acts not subject to the hearsay
rules.313 Thus, the classification of harmful speech as a form of illegal
conduct should be readily acceptable to the Court.31 4
ties, place bets with bookies, threaten [or] extort," even though each may be accom-
plished by speech).
309. See John D. Calamari and Joseph M. Perillo, The Law of Contracts § 19-1, at
774-76 (3d ed. 1987).
310. See United States v. Daly, 756 F.2d 1076, 1082 (5th Cir. 1985) (stating that
illegal conduct in the preparation of false income tax returns is not protected by the
First Amendment just because the conduct was carried out by means of language).
311. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts §§ 112-13,
at 788-93 (5th ed. 1984).
312. See N.Y. Penal Law § 105 (McKinney 1987). The law does require evidence of
an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, id. at § 105.20, but the act may consist
solely of speech. See People v. Weaver, 550 N.Y.S.2d 467 (1990) (telephone conversa-
tions between conspirators concerning the purchase of cocaine were overt acts in fur-
therance of a conspiracy to distribute cocaine); People v. Bongarzone, 500 N.Y.S.2d
532 (1986) (conversations between the defendant's mother and another defendant
were sufficient independent acts by a coconspirator, which tended to further the con-
spiracy and did not simply restate the agreement to conspire).
313. See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, Evidence Under The
Rules 135 (2d ed. 1993).
314. Most recently, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment in the controversial
speech case, Harleston v. Jeffries, 21 F.3d 1238 (2d Cir. 1994), vacated and remanded,
No. 94-112, 1994 WL 388592 (U.S. November 14, 1994), in which City College of the
City University of New York was found to have violated the First Amendment rights
of a professor by limiting his term as chair of the black studies department, in part
because of the harmful consequences likely to arise from a virulently anti-semitic
speech that he had given. 21 F.3d at 1241. The Court remanded the case in light of its
recent decision in Waters v. Churchill, 114 S. Ct. 1878 (1994), in which it vacated a
Seventh Circuit judgment because the court had used the wrong standard to deter-
mine whether a discharged public employee's First Amendment rights had been vio-
lated. Id. at 1891.
The Supreme Court's decision in Jeffries follows a line of cases involving the speech
rights of government employees. In the earliest of these cases, the Court balanced the
right of public employees to speak on matters of public concern with the interest of
the state, as employer, to promote efficiency in performing public services through its
employees. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 569 (1968). The operative
test in this area of First Amendment law hinges on whether the employer can reason-
ably conclude that the employee's speech might be disruptive of the government's
delivery of public services.
Although government employee speech is treated differently than private speech,
and the Jeffries case is limited to First Amendment claims against public employers,
the principle underlying the Court's analysis in this line of cases is the same. Words
spoken in certain circumstances may be more akin to conduct than to speech in the
response they invite. In those instances when words take on the force of disruptive
activity, they may be regulated in the service of other more important goals, such as
the efficient management of public administration.
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Therefore, the question remains: How can legislatures and courts
apply the fighting words doctrine to hate crimes in a manner that ef-
fects the goals of the doctrine without infringing impermissibly on the
rights of free speech guaranteed by the First Amendment? This part
suggests two ways in which the fighting words doctrine may continue
to be effectively applied in the construction of constitutional "fighting
words" statutes. The first is a version of the two-provision statute in
Mitchell, with a content-neutral criminal component and an additional
content-based penalty enhancement component. The second model is
a single provision statute that parallels the structure of the employ-
ment discrimination provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.3'5
A. A Two-Provision Fighting Words Statute
In R.A.V., Justice Scalia proposed that "a prohibition of fighting
words that are directed at certain persons or groups" would be facially
valid.31 6 Practically, his proposal could amount to a general fighting
words restriction and an additional prohibition against directing the
comments toward a particular person or group. This recipe for a con-
stitutional statute foreshadowed the Court's favorable response to the
penalty enhancement statutes that states enacted following R.A. V.
Yet, the Court's result in Mitchell was based on a penalty-enhance-
ment statute that appears to preclude precisely this type of statutory
construction.
The Wisconsin statute317 exempts from penalty enhancement any
crime "'if proof of race, religion, color, disability, sexual orientation,
national origin or ancestry is required for a conviction for that
crime.' "31 Proof that a victim was selected because of race, religion,
or another listed characteristic technically is not necessary to sustain a
conviction under a general fighting words prohibition. However, in
order to determine whether challenged words even constitute fighting
words, courts must inquire into the associations of the addressee.
See also Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality Of Consent 72 (1975) (comparing as-
saultive speech to physical aggression); Lawrence, supra note 21, at 452 (likening ra-
cial epithets to physical blows); Shea, supra note 136, at 9 (asserting that abusive
speech is "not a form of communicative speech but rather a medium of something
approaching a physical assault").
315. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
316. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2548. Justice Scalia distinguished this proposed statute,
which would be neutral with respect to the content of the words prohibited, from the
St. Paul ordinance, which prohibited "fighting words that contain ... messages of
'bias-motivated' hatred." Id.
317. Section 1 of the Wisconsin penalty-enhancement statute provides that if a per-
son commits a crime and intentionally selects the victim "'because of race, religion,
color, disability, sexual orientation, national origin or ancestry,'" the penalties for the
underlying crime are enhanced. Mitchell II, 113 S. Ct. at 2197 n.1 (quoting Wis. Stat.
§ 939.645(1)(b) (West 1993)).
318. Id (quoting Wis. Stat. § 939.645(4) (\Vest 1993)).
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For example, the expressive activity of cross burning has potentially
harmful consequences when directed at African-Americans3 19 and
may constitute fighting words in that context. The same activity con-
ducted at a meeting of white supremacists would not constitute fight-
ing words at all.320 While proof of a listed characteristic is not
"required" as an element of the crime, a court will require evidence of
race, religion or other unique characteristic to determine if a defend-
ant's speech violates the prohibition against fighting words. There-
fore, as a practical matter, the language of the Mitchell statute, which
requires that there be an underlying crime apart from the bias motiva-
tion, precludes structuring a fighting words statute in a way that
makes fighting words a general crime, and at the same time, enhances
the penalty because of the bias associated with the crime.
Most recently, however, the Supreme Court of New Jersey upheld a
harassment statute with a penalty enhancement provision in which
some purely verbal communications could constitute the underlying
crime. In State v. Mortimer,321 the defendant was charged with fourth
degree harassment for spray painting the words "Dots U Smell" on
the house of a Pakistani family.322 The harassment statute under
which the defendant was convicted provided in relevant part that a
person commits an offense if:
"[W]ith purpose to harass another, he: a. Makes, or causes to be
made, a communication or communications ... in offensively coarse
language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm;
... d. A person commits a crime of the fourth degree if in commit-
ting an offense under this section, he acted, at least in part, with ill
will, hatred or bias toward, and with a purpose to intimidate, an
319. See Lawrence, supra note 21, at 471-72; Matsuda, supra note 22, at 2365-66.
320. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445 (1969) (burning a cross at a
Ku Klux Klan rally); see also supra note 8 (suggesting that it is the use and context of
a word that determines its value either as speech or unprotected conduct).
321. State v. Mortimer, 641 A.2d 257, 260 (N.J. 1994), cert. denied, 63 U.S.L.W.
3347 (U.S. Oct. 31, 1994) (No. 94-5898).
On the same day that the court decided Mortimer, it also struck down a hate crime
statute virtually analogous to the St. Paul ordinance in R.A.V. State v. Vawter, 642
A.2d 349, 352 (N.J. 1994). Although the court disagreed with the Supreme Court's
analysis in R.A.V., it was compelled to follow the Court's holding. Id. at 357.
322. Mortimer, 641 A.2d at 260. The New Jersey Supreme Court described the
epithet as "a scurrilous, offensive allusion that incorporates a reference to the tika, a
mark on the forehead of some Hindus, especially women, indicating caste or status, or
worn by both sexes as an ornament." Id.
The defendant also was charged with another count of harassment for painting a
swastika on a car parked in front of the home of a Jewish family. Id. The defendant
pleaded guilty to that count and agreed to pay restitution to the family in exchange
for the state's recommendation to the trial court to dismiss the other count and limit
any sentence to a maximum of five years probation. Id.
Before his sentencing, the Supreme Court handed down its decision in R.A.V. Id.
On the basis of that decision, the defendant withdrew his plea and filed a motion to
dismiss, which the trial court granted. Id. at 260-61.
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individual or group of individuals because of race, color, religion,
sexual orientation or ethnicity. ' 31
The defendant argued that subsection (a) was itself unconstitution-
ally vague.324 The court rejected that claim, stating that "the require-
ment, applying to all of section 4, that a defendant act 'with purpose to
harass another' serves to clarify the otherwise-vague phrases of sub-
section a. ',3 1 Although the court did not technically apply a "fighting
words" construction to its harassment statute, the language of subsec-
tion (a) closely tracks the language of the New Hampshire statute in
Chaplinsky.326 Additionally, the intent requirement also parallels the
language of the New Hampshire statute.327 Thus, while the court re-
frained from applying a fighting words construction to the statute, the
harassment law essentially prohibits the same speech activity that is
the basis of the fighting words doctrine.32
On the basis of the holdings in R.A. V. and Mitchell, the New Jersey
Supreme Court could have reasoned that the underlying crime, which
consisted only of speech, was not sufficiently tailored to prohibit only
fighting words, and was, therefore, impermissibly overbroad. Or, it
could have concluded that because the underlying crime consisted
only of speech, the penalty enhancement provision essentially pun-
ished speech because of its bigoted content, making it impermissibly
content-based.
Instead of placing a technical fighting words construction on the
statute, however, the court applied the conduct principle of fighting
words to uphold the statute. The court construed subsection (a) as a
prohibition of the conduct implications of fighting words, distinct from
the penalty enhancement provision in subsection (d).2 9 Thus, subsec-
tion (a) comprises an independent verbal offense.330 Subsection (d)
acts as a typical penalty enhancement provision, without reference to
the substance of the offense in subsection (a).331 Together, the two
provisions target harmful, bias-motivated fighting words, while only
323. I. at 260 (quoting NJ. Stat. Ann. 2C:33-4d (West 1991)).
324. Id. at 264.
325. Id. at 266. (citing State v. Finance Am. Corp., 440 A.2d 28 (NJ. 1981)).
326. See supra note 38.
327. Compare the text of the New Hampshire statute, supra note 38 ("with intent
to deride, offend or annoy") with the text of the New Jersey statute, supra text accom-
panying note 323 ("with purpose to harass another").
328. The standard dictionary definition of the term "harass"-to disturb or irritate
persistently-does not necessarily require retaliatory conduct on the part of the vic-
tim of harassment. The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 600
(1976). Nevertheless, in statutory constructions, the term "harassment" is often used
to describe a misdemeanor when, "with purpose to harass," one "'insults, taunts or
challenges another in a manner likely to provoke violent or disorderly response.'"
Black's Law Dictionary 494 (6th ed. 1991) (quoting the Model Penal Code § 250.4).
329. 641 A.2d at 261.
330. Id. (describing subsection (a) as "freestanding, because [it] defines an offense
in its own right").
331. Id. The court stated that because subsection (a) comprised its own offense:
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incidentally restricting speech. Moreover, any incidental restriction
on speech is without reference to the content of that speech.
B. A Single Provision Fighting Words Statute
The New Jersey statute reviewed in Mortimer was formally struc-
tured as a penalty enhancement statute, with separate provisions for
the underlying crime and the increased penalty. However, since the
primary provision prohibits only the conduct implications of fighting
words, it is unnecessary to classify separately a list of designated types
of fighting words, which when directed at particular groups, are likely
to have particularly violent consequences. In other words, because
the underlying provision only incidentally restricts speech, it falls
within the O'Brien exception to the R.A.V. rule against content-based
speech restrictions.332 There is, therefore, no need to separate out a
general, neutral fighting words provision from a content-based penalty
enhancement provision.
A single provision statute prohibiting fighting words on the basis of
a select list of characteristics could be modeled after Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.333 Title VII prohibits discrimination in the
workplace "because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. ' '334
Although Title VII is clearly content-based, the Supreme Court re-
peatedly has invoked Title VII as an example of a permissible content-
based regulation because it restricts conduct, not speech.335
[It] decline[d] to read subsections a and d together to create a single substan-
tive offense akin to that struck down by the Supreme Court in R.A.V. [It
could not] apply subsection d until a defendant has engaged in the conduct
that subsection a proscribes. Accordingly, subsection d applied on top of
subsection a d[id] not punish the mere expression of hate, as did the St. Paul
ordinance in R.A.V.
Id.
332. See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
333. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-17 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
334. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The section makes it "an unlawful employment
practice for an employer.., to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such indi-
vidual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Id.
335. See Mitchell 11, 113 S. Ct. at 2200 (referring to Title VII as a constitutional
regulation of discriminatory conduct); R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2546 (excepting Title VII
from its presumptive rule against content-based regulations because it regulates con-
duct, not speech); Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 78 (1984) (rejecting the
claim that Title VII infringes on an employer's First Amendment rights); see also
State v. Wyant, 597 N.E.2d 450, 456 (Ohio 1992) (distinguishing Title VII as a regula-
tion of conduct from "impermissible" penalty enhancement statutes, which regulate
offensive thought), vacated and remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2954 (1993), rev'd, 624 N.E.2d
722 (1994). But see Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile Environment
Harassment and The First Amendment, 52 Ohio L.J. 481 (1991) (arguing that Title VII
hostile work environment claims contravene the First Amendment); Jules B. Gerrard,
The First Amendment in a Hostile Environment: A Primer on Free Speech and Sexual
Harassment, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1003 (1993) (arguing that the EEOC guidelines
regarding harassment under Title VII are probably unconstitutionally overbroad).
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Under Title VII, activity including otherwise lawful speech, may be
punishable as unlawful conduct 336 when it results in creating a "hostile
or abusive work environment. ' 337 Not all harassment, however, con-
stitutes a violation of Title VII. For example, the " 'mere utterance of
an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feelings' "would
not rise to the level of a Title VII violation.338 To be actionable, the
harassment must be sufficiently severe so as " 'to alter the conditions
of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive working environ-
ment.' 1339 The standard is objective, to the extent that the work envi-
ronment must be one that a reasonable person would find hostile or
abusive.34° Moreover, the Equal Opportunity Employment Commis-
sion's guidelines require that, in determining whether conduct consti-
tutes sexual harassment, a court must consider "'the record as a
whole'" and" 'the totality of the circumstances, such as the nature of
the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred.' "341
Similarly, in the context of fighting words, speech that would other-
wise be protected may constitute punishable conduct when communi-
cated in a manner and context in which it is likely to engender
retaliatory conduct. Offensive words, even when directed to a particu-
lar addressee, do not constitute fighting words unless they are likely to
result in harmful conduct.342 Like Title VII, the standard is that of a
reasonable person in the place of the addressee. 3  Furthermore, as
Justice Stevens emphasized in his concurrence in R.A.V., fighting
words are to a great degree determined by the context in which they
In Mitchell, the Court stated that "in KA. V.v. SL Paul, we cited Title VII as an
example of a permissible content-neutral regulation of conduct." 113 S. Ct. at 2200.
As a statutory matter, however, Title VII is content-based, and the Court so acknowl-
edged that fact in RA.V. 112 S. Ct. at 2546. Nevertheless, to the extent that it regu-
lates conduct, and not speech, Title VII is content-neutral for purposes of First
Amendment scrutiny. It is primarily the usage of speech, not its content, that is at
issue in determining whether the speech violates Title VII.
336. In describing the kinds of sexual harassment that may be actionable under
Title VII, Congress included "'[unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual fa-
vors, and other verbal.., conduct of a sexual nature.'" Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (emphasis added) (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1985)).
337. Id at 66.
338. Id. at 67 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
339. ld. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
340. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993). The Court in Harris
indicated, however, that the standard is more like a reasonable person of the same
gender, race, religion, etc., as the victim. Id. at 371. The Court also added that "if the
victim does not subjectively perceive the environment to be abusive, the conduct has
not actually altered the conditions of the victim's employment, and there is no Title
VII violation." Id. at 370.
341. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 69 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
342. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 336-38.
343. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text; cf supra text accompanying
note 340.
1994]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
are expressed. 344 Like Title VII, a court must look to "the totality of
the circumstances" surrounding a communication to determine
whether a speaker's words, in a particular context, constitute fighting
words.
Title VII is statutorily limited to eradicating discrimination in the
workplace.345 Nevertheless, it reflects a general consensus in the law
that discrimination on the basis of immutable characteristics like gen-
der or race is unacceptable. In enacting Title VII, Congress sought to
reflect, as well as influence, how society treats gender and other differ-
ences, by regulating discriminatory conduct that exploits these very
differences between people. Similarly, statutes that are constructed to
prohibit fighting words based on particular "disfavored topics" mirror
the general consensus, whether local, state or national, that these
forms of expression are likely to result in uniquely harmful conse-
quences. But, in doing so, fighting words statutes can be drafted so as
not to target the expression itself. Rather, like Title VII, which seeks
to prevent the pernicious consequences of discrimination in the work-
place, they can be aimed at preventing the conduct implications of
fighting words-the harmful activity that lies at the core of the fight-
ing words doctrine.
CONCLUSION
As Justice Holmes recognized three quarters of a century ago,346
words are not merely combinations of letters. The value in a word is
not in the thing itself, but in its use as a medium of communication. It
is the meaning we imbue to a word that transforms it from a series of
letters into an instrument of speech, which we then can use to partici-
pate in dialogue, as well as to exchange ideas. Thus, when words are
used to engender conduct as opposed to responsive dialogue, we do
not value them as "speech," but only as "talk." This empty talk may
be regulated, consistent with the First Amendment, because what is
being prohibited is merely the conduct implications of harmful fight-
ing words, and not their value as "speech." In other contexts, when
these same words are used to produce dialogue or the expression of
ideas, they may then be valued as constitutionally protected "speech."
Thus, the fighting words doctrine provides the doctrinal framework
for outlawing words when they are used as a medium for violence.
The Court's speech/conduct distinction in O'Brien makes the
Court's analysis in fighting words cases easier to comprehend.
Chaplinsky and its progeny thus can be understood as a line of consis-
tent jurisprudence, all predicated on the conduct-related doctrine of
fighting words. Moreover, the Court's most recent pronouncements
344. See supra notes 8, 196 and accompanying text; see also pp. 829-30.
345. See supra note 334.
346. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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regarding fighting words, in R.A.V. and Mitchell, finally make explicit
the Court's emphasis on the conduct implications of words and not on
their value as instruments of "speech."
While penalty enhancement statutes, such as the Wisconsin law in
Mitchell, combat some types of hate crimes, they do not encompass
fighting words directly. On the other hand, the New Jersey statute in
Mortimer, and laws like it, give credence to the viability of the fighting
words doctrine as a means to prohibit the conduct implications of
fighting words. Once fighting words are understood as conduct-re-
lated, laws prohibiting them may be constructed as either two-provi-
sion statutes, like the New Jersey law, or single provision statutes, like
Title VII. These models ultimately do not violate the First Amend-
ment precisely because their focus is on regulating conduct, and not
on restricting speech.
The lesson to be learned from Chaplinsky and its progeny is that the
First Amendment, as short a document as it is, means what it says
when commanding that speech be free. But not all language counts as
speech. Words have great power, but also carry a comparable burden.
Those who rely upon and value language are entrusted with the re-
sponsibility to use it as speech. Anything less, whether it be deemed a
proscribable category, imminent lawless action or harmful conduct, is
still, and always has been, subject to regulation.
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